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10.1 Introduction
As compared to most other industrialized economies, Sweden has high
labor force participation among older workers. In the group of countries
studied in Gruber and Wise (1999),1 only France, Germany, and Japan
have higher male labor force participation among ﬁfty-ﬁve year olds, while
only Japan has higher participation rates among sixty year olds. By age
sixty-ﬁve, labor force participation is higher in the United States, Canada,
and Japan than in Sweden.
Despite these relatively high participation rates, Sweden shares the trend
of declining labor force participation among elderly workers experienced
in recent decades in other Western industrialized economies: Labor force
participation among men aged between sixty and sixty-four has declined
from about 85 percent in the early 1960s to about 55 percent in the mid-
1990s.
Since the general health status of the Swedish population has improved
over this period of time, the decline in labor force participation has to be
explained by other factors. These may include changes in the availability of
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1. These countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands,
Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.programs for ﬁnancing early exit from the labor market, improved eco-
nomic conditions in the population, changes in economic incentives in
general, and changes in collective agreements on retirement age between
trade unions and employers’ confederations.
In this study, we estimate how economic incentives inherent in the income
security system and compulsory old age pensions aﬀect retirement behav-
ior. Social security policy may have a dual eﬀect on economic incentives for
labor force participation. First, it may aﬀect the level of an individual’s so-
cial security wealth. An increase in social security wealth will increase an
individual’s demand for all goods, including leisure, and will, therefore, in-
crease their propensity to retire early. Second, it may aﬀect the accrual in
the social security wealth from additional work. High accrual from work-
ing one additional year implies a substitution eﬀect to delay retirement.
In our retirement probit regressions, net social security wealth is in-
cluded to measure the income eﬀect. We use three diﬀerent measures of ac-
crual: beneﬁt accrual, peak value, and option value. The measure of bene-
ﬁt accrual is myopic in the sense that it refers only to the immediate gain or
loss to a worker from remaining in the labor force one additional year. The
measure of peak value encompasses future possible gains from remaining
in the labor force. In addition to considering future possible income gains,
the measure of option value also allows for diﬀerent valuations of leisure
time when retired.
A large share of those who permanently leave the Swedish labor market
receive their main income from disability, sickness, or unemployment in-
surance. The replacement levels in these programs are higher in general
than in the old age pension scheme, which has to be taken into account
when measuring the economic incentive variables. However, since labor
market insurance programs have requirements on health or employment
status, support from these programs is not an available option for all work-
ers. To avoid potential endogeneity problems, we use the eligibility proba-
bilities as weights when calculating net social security wealth and the ac-
crual measures for all workers in the sample.
In addition to estimating the econometric model, we simulate the eﬀect
of two hypothetical policy reforms. The ﬁrst delays the age of eligibility for
all retirement schemes by three years. In the second experiment, existing
retirement schemes are superseded by a program that replaces 60 percent
of predicted earnings at age sixty. The normal retirement age is sixty-ﬁve,
but the pension can be claimed from age sixty to age seventy with an actu-
arial reduction or increase of 6 percent for every year in advance or delay
from age sixty-ﬁve.
We use a panel data set containing individual characteristics (such as ed-
ucation and sector of employment), detailed information on income com-
ponents between 1983 and 1997, and contributions to the public pension
scheme extending back to 1960. The data set was obtained by merging in-
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registers. We restricted the sample to men and women born between 1927
and 1940, which resulted in a sample size of about 30,000 individuals, and
we study their retirement behavior between 1984 and 1996. This is the ﬁrst
time this comparatively rich data set has been used in a study on retirement
behavior. Therefore, we provide detailed descriptions of how diﬀerent
variables, date of retirement, in particular are measured.
Our results support the view that economic incentives matter for retire-
ment behavior on the Swedish labor market. Estimates of the econometric
model reveal that measures of economic incentives are, in general, signiﬁ-
cant and with the expected signs. However, the results from the simulations
emphasize the importance of collective agreements on normal retirement
age, which are supported by Swedish labor legislation.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 10.2 we describe the insti-
tutions that aﬀect the economic incentives for retirement decisions—such
as rules for diﬀerent pension schemes, labor market insurance, housing al-
lowances, and income taxes—during the period under study, that is, 1983–
1997. Parts of this section are very detailed, mainly to facilitate further re-
search on economic incentives and retirement behavior. (Most readers can
skip large parts of this section without losing the ability to follow the rest
of the paper.) Section 10.2 also provides a descriptive analysis of the fre-
quency of diﬀerent pathways to permanent exit from the labor market. Sec-
tion 10.3 reviews previous research on retirement behavior in Sweden. We
present the data set in section 10.4 and show how the diﬀerent measures of
economic incentives are obtained in section 10.5. The empirical models
and estimation results are outlined in section 10.6. Section 10.7 reports re-
sults from simulations of the estimated models. Section 10.8 concludes.
10.2 Institutional Background
We begin by describing the general policy environment for income secu-
rity, old age pensions, and income taxes in Sweden pertinent to the cohorts
in our sample, born between 1927 and 1940, and the time period under
study (i.e., 1983–1997). We then describe the frequency of diﬀerent path-
ways to retirement.
10.2.1 The Social Security System
The public old age pension system in Sweden consists of three parts: a
basic pension, a supplementary pension (known as allmän tilläggspension;
ATP), and the part-time retirement pension. These are ﬁnanced through
proportional payroll taxes (employers’ contributions) levied on wages.
All Swedish citizens and all persons residing in Sweden are entitled to a
basic pension. In principle, everyone receives the same amount regardless
of previous earnings. The amount is reduced if the duration of residence in
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in Sweden is less than thirty years. Like all social-insurance schemes, the
basic pension is related to a basic amount (BA). Although the BA is linked
to the consumer price index (CPI), it is decided each year by the govern-
ment. A majority in the Swedish Parliament can thus make discretionary
changes that deviate from the development of the CPI. During the 1990s,
pensions were not fully aligned with price indexing, due mainly to several
measures aimed at cutting the government budget deﬁcit. In 1995, the BA
was SKr34,986, and the annual wage of an average production worker was
SKr189,488.
The basic pension for a single old age pensioner is 96 percent of the BA;
it is reduced to 78.5 percent if the person is married. Before 1995, it was not
reduced unless the individual was married to someone who also received
the basic pension. Individuals with no or low ATP are entitled to a special
supplement. This supplement is independent of marital status and has
grown from 42 percent of the BA in 1983 to 55.5 percent as of 1993. The
special supplement is reduced on a one-to-one basis against the supple-
mentary pension. Thus a single old age pensioner with only a basic pen-
sion and a special supplement receives 151.5 percent of the BA. In 1995,
this amounted to SKr53,004 in annual pension or 28.0 percent of the an-
nual earnings of an average production worker.
The basic pension also contains a survivor’s pension. Widows receive 90
percent of a BA until they reach the age of sixty-ﬁve. If a woman is younger
than ﬁfty when her husband dies, the amount is reduced. The basic pension
for widows has been income tested since 1997. Children normally receive
25 percent of a BA, but the amount may be higher if there is no ATP.
A new, gender-neutral transitional pension for men and women born in
1945 and later was implemented in 1990. The transitional pension is paid
for six months after the decease of a spouse and amounts to 90 percent of
a BA. The transitional pension can be prolonged for a survivor who has the
custody of children.
The beneﬁt level of ATP is related to an individual’s earnings history and
is determined in three steps. The ﬁrst step involves determining pension-
rights income for each year from the age of sixteen. Pension-rights income
is calculated on the basis of income from labor reported in an individual’s
annual tax return and is the share of the income exceeding 1 BA and below
the social security ceiling at 7.5 BA.2 It is set to zero if annual income from
labor does not exceed 1 BA. In addition to earnings and income from self-
employment, the pension-rights income includes transfer payments from so-
cial insurance (such as income from sickness and unemployment insurance),
the parental cash beneﬁt, and the partial retirement pension. Three years of
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2. The proportional payroll tax used to ﬁnance the ATP scheme is paid also on the share of
income exceeding 7.5 BA.pension-rights income greater than zero between the ages of sixteen and
sixty-four are required to receive an old age pension from the ATP scheme.
In the second step, average pension points are calculated by dividing
pension-rights income by the corresponding year’s BA to obtain the pen-
sion points for each year. Thus, due to the social security ceiling at 7.5 BAs,
the maximum number of pension points an individual may receive in any
given year is 6.5. Average pension points comprise the average of an indi-
vidual’s ﬁfteen best years of earnings.
The ﬁnal step is to calculate an individual’s ATP beneﬁt (Y i ) by applying
the formula




i  , 1    BA,
where AP i denotes individual average pension points, BA is the basic
amount, and Ni is the number of years the individual has reported a pen-
sion-rights income greater than zero. Thirty years with pension points are
required for full ATP for individuals born in 1924 and thereafter. Inserting
the amount of the BA in 1995 into the ATP formula reveals that the maxi-
mum pension amount from the Swedish national pension system in 1995
was SKr170,032.
There are no dependent’s beneﬁts within the ATP scheme—that is, the
amount of the pension is independent of marital status, and there is no
splitting of future ATP beneﬁts in the event of a divorce.
For women born before 1945, the survivor’s beneﬁt in the ATP system is
35–40 percent of the deceased husband’s ATP pension for a surviving wife
and 10–15 percent (20–30 percent after the 1990 reform) for a surviving
child, depending on the number of children. The widow’s pension is 35 per-
cent if there are children in the household who are eligible for a children’s
pension and 40 percent otherwise. Before the 1990 reform, the widow’s
pension from ATP was lifelong.
As of 1991, extensive transition rules apply for new survivors. Women
born before 1930 still receive a lifelong widow’s pension. For a widow born
between 1930 and 1944, her survivor’s ATP is reduced after age sixty-ﬁve,
taking into account her own ATP. The rules vary somewhat for diﬀerent
birth cohorts. As for the basic pension, for women born after 1 January
1945, the widow’s pension is replaced by a gender-neutral transition pen-
sion. The transition pension is paid for six months after the decease of a
spouse. However, women born in 1945 and thereafter may also receive a
widow’s pension according to special rules and based on the deceased hus-
band’s pension points up until 1990.
The basic pension and ATP can be claimed in advance at age sixty3 or
postponed until age seventy. If an individual chooses to withdraw from the
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3. In 1998, the early retirement age was raised to sixty-one.labor market in advance of reaching sixty-ﬁve, the amount of the monthly
beneﬁt is permanently reduced by 0.5 percent for each month of early
withdrawal: For example, if an individual retires at sixty, the permanent re-
duction is 30 percent. If an individual decides to claim a pension later than
at age sixty-ﬁve, the pension income is permanently increased by 0.7 per-
cent for each month of postponement.
A partial retirement pension allows workers aged sixty-one and older to
reduce their hours of work and receive a beneﬁt to replace lost earnings. To
be eligible for part-time retirement, a worker must have accumulated ten
years of pension-rights earnings after age forty-ﬁve and must work at least
seventeen hours per week after the reduction. As of 1 July 1994, the bene-
ﬁt is 55 percent of the diﬀerence in earnings before and after part-time re-
tirement.
The principal rules of a new pension system intended to replace the ba-
sic pension, ATP, and partial retirement pension were decided in 1994. The
main changes are that earnings from an individual’s entire life cycle are
counted when pension income is determined, rather than only the ﬁfteen
best years; pensions are related to the real growth rate in the entire econ-
omy rather than price indexes; and changes in life expectancy also aﬀect
annual pension income (that is, increased life expectancy and lower eco-
nomic growth rates reduce individual pension income at a given retirement
age). The ﬁrst birth cohort aﬀected by the new system comprises those
born in 1938, who will have four-twentieths of their pension determined
according to the new rules and the remainder according to the old rules.
The share in the new system is then increased by one-twentieth for each
successive birth cohort.
10.2.2 Occupational Pensions
Almost all of the Swedish labor market is covered by central agreements
between the unions and employers’ confederations. These central agree-
ments include occupational pension schemes ﬁnanced through employers’
contributions. There are basically four occupational pension plans cover-
ing diﬀerent groups on the labor market: (a) blue-collar workers in the
private sector; (b) white-collar workers in the private sector; (c) central gov-
ernment employees; and (d) local government employees.4
Pension rights are transferable among these four main schemes. Each of
these pension schemes is brieﬂy described below concentrating on the time
period covered by the panel data set used in this study (i.e., 1983–1997).
Occupational Pensions for Private-Sector Blue-Collar Workers
In 1996, the earlier pay-as-you-go pension scheme (STP) was replaced
by a fully funded pension plan. The blue-collar workers in our sample are
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4. See Kangas and Palme (1989) for a more detailed description of diﬀerent occupational
pension schemes in Sweden.thus covered by three diﬀerent occupational pension regimes: those born
between 1927 and 1931 who are covered entirely by STP; those born be-
tween 1932 and 1938 who may choose between the STP rules and a “tran-
sitional pension;” and those born in 1939 and later are covered by the tran-
sition pension.
As a monthly payment starting the month of a worker’s sixty-ﬁfth birth-
day, STP could not be claimed in advance or postponed. The size of the
pension was determined as 10 percent of the average of the worker’s
monthly earnings during his three best years between age ﬁfty-ﬁve and
ﬁfty-nine. If the worker contributed to the scheme for less than thirty years
after age twenty-eight, the pension was reduced proportionally. To receive
any pension at all, a worker was required to contribute at least three years
between ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and ﬁfty-nine. The STP is indexed by the BA, and
the social security ceiling at 7.5 BAs applies here as well.
In the new, fully funded pension scheme for blue-collar workers, a share
of gross earnings is paid into a personal account in a pension fund. Be-
tween 1996 and 2000, the contribution rate was 2.0 percent of gross earn-
ings and, according to the new agreement in eﬀect from 2000, the share is
3.5 percent. Each worker can choose among about a dozen insurance com-
panies to manage their pension fund. The ﬁrst cohort aﬀected by the new
system was born in 1932. However, since this cohort, as well as the later co-
horts in our sample, worked under the STP system, they have not made any
payments to pension funds and are, therefore, subject to so-called transi-
tion rules.
Pensions under these transition rules are determined by the sum of two
parts. The ﬁrst part is 10 percent of average earnings, deﬂated by the BA,
that are below the social security ceiling from age thirty. The second part is
the amount a worker receives from the funded pension. Since the STP
scheme allows a worker to choose the average of their best three years be-
tween ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and ﬁfty-nine, and the pension from the funded system
is very low, pensions under the transition rules are, in general, lower than
STP. However, the birth cohorts between 1932 and 1938 may opt for the old
STP scheme if it turns out to be more favorable.
Occupational Pensions for Private-Sector White-Collar Workers
White-collar workers in the private sector are covered by ITP, ITPK,
and ITPG. The ITP is a deﬁned-beneﬁt scheme, ITPK is fully funded, and
ITPG guarantees that a worker covered by ITP receives at least what he
would have been entitled to if he had been covered by the STP scheme.
The ITP is determined by a worker’s earnings the year before they retire:
I is 10 percent of that year’s salary up to 7.5 BAs, 65 percent of the salary
between 7.5 and 20 BAs, and 32.5 percent between 20 and 30 BAs. As in
the STP scheme, the pension is reduced proportionally if a worker has con-
tributed for less than thirty years since age twenty-eight. Contributions to
ITP have been around 4.5 percent of gross earnings in the 1980s and 1990s.
Income Security Programs and Retirement in Sweden 585The normal retirement age for ITP is sixty-ﬁve. Table 10.1 shows the re-
duction (or enhancement) if a worker starts to claim (or postpone) retire-
ment beneﬁts between ages sixty and seventy. Also, ITP can also be claimed
before age sixty, in which case the amount of the pension is determined by
an individual actuarial adjustment.
The ITPK was introduced in 1977 and is a fully funded system. During
the 1980s and 1990s, contributions amounted to approximately 2 percent
of each worker’s labor earnings up to 30 BAs. Contributions to the ITPK
scheme start when a worker is aged thirty. They are free to choose a com-
pany to manage their ITPK pension. ITPK is normally claimed as monthly
payments over a ﬁve-year period after retirement. As ITPK was intro-
duced in 1977, it is maturing during the period covered by our data (the
1927 cohort of workers were aged ﬁfty in 1977 and the 1940 cohort was
aged thirty-seven). This implies that the ITPK pensions are, on average,
larger for the younger cohorts.
Pensions for Central Government Employees
Pensions for central government employees are regulated in central
agreements between the trade unions and the state. Prior to 1992, the oc-
cupational pension scheme for employees in the central government pro-
vided a gross pension in the sense that it totally replaced the state pension
for workers covered by the scheme. The size of the pension was calculated
as 65 percent of earnings for the year before retirement. A full pension re-
quired thirty years of earnings, and the pension was reduced proportion-
ally if the worker did not fulﬁll that requirement.
Most people employed by central government have a mandatory retire-
ment age of sixty-ﬁve. There are several exceptions, such as military per-
sonnel, whose mandatory retirement age is ﬁfty-ﬁve. Before 1992, central
government employees could not claim their occupational pension prior to
their mandatory retirement age. If they wanted to retire earlier, they could
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70 1.448claim their state pension with actuarial adjustment and their occupational
pension as a lifelong annuity. This annuity was calculated as 65 percent of
95 percent of an individual’s earnings the year before they retired. This
amount was not indexed and not paid out until they reached the manda-
tory retirement age. After that, it was indexed by the BA and paid as a life-
long annuity.
After 1992, two supplementary occupational pension schemes, one fully
funded and one pay-as-you-go, replaced the former gross pension. In the
fully funded system, 1.7 percent of a worker’s annual salary, starting from
1991, is paid to a pension fund. The pay-as-you-go is very similar to the
ITP, but it is determined by average earnings during the ﬁve years preced-
ing retirement rather than by an individual’s earnings the year before re-
tirement. It is 10 percent of this ﬁve-year average up to 7.5 BAs, 65 percent
between 7.5 and 20 BAs, and 32.5 percent between 20 and 30 BAs. The
pension is reduced proportionally if the requirement of thirty years of con-
tributions to the scheme since age twenty-eight is not fulﬁlled.
In contrast to the pre-1992 occupational pension for central government
employees, the post-1992 pension can be claimed ﬁve years before the
mandatory retirement age with an actuarial adjustment. This adjustment
is a 0.4 percent lifelong reduction for each month the pension is received
prior to an individual’s sixty-ﬁfth birthday. However, if someone retires be-
fore age sixty, the pre-1992 rules apply (i.e., no beneﬁt prior to the manda-
tory retirement age). This pension can also be postponed with a 0.4 percent
lifelong increase for each month it is delayed up to ﬁve years after the
mandatory retirement age.
Pensions for Local Government Employees
The pension plan for employees in local governments (or municipalities)
is regulated by a central agreement between the union and a confederation
for Sweden’s municipalities. Two agreements aﬀect pensions for the time
period covered by the data in this study: the ﬁrst was made in 1978 and the
second in 1985.
According to the 1985 agreement, the size of the pension is determined
by the average of the employee’s ﬁve best years of earnings during the
seven-year period prior to the year of retirement. The pension is then cal-
culated as 96 percent of this amount below 1 BAs, 78.5 percent between 1
and 2.5 BAs, 60 percent between 2.5 and 3.5 BAs, 65 percent between 7.5
and 20 BAs, and 32.5 percent between 20 and 30 BAs. A full pension re-
quires thirty years of employment in the local government sector between
ages eighteen and sixty-ﬁve; otherwise the pension is reduced proportion-
ally. This pension scheme is fully coordinated with the state pension. This
means that only the amount exceeding the state pension is paid.
The normal retirement age is sixty-ﬁve for most local government em-
ployees, but an individual can enter retirement at age sixty or postpone it
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duced for the rest of their life by 0.3 percent per month between ages sixty-
three and sixty-ﬁve, by 0.4 percent between ages sixty-two and sixty-three,
and by 0.5 percent per month between ages sixty and sixty-two. The pen-
sion is increased by 0.1 percent for each month the individual decides to
continue to work after age sixty-ﬁve. The rules for claiming before age sixty
are very similar to those in the pension scheme for central government em-
ployees: The pension is transformed into a lifelong annuity that is paid out
starting at age sixty-ﬁve.
10.2.3 Disability, Sickness, and Unemployment Insurance
Disability Insurance
The disability insurance (DI) scheme is very similar to the state old age
pension during the period covered by the study.5 It consists of a basic pen-
sion, an income-related ATP supplement, and a special supplement. Pen-
sion income is determined in much the same way as the old age pension ben-
eﬁt but without any actuarial reduction for early retirement. An “assumed”
pension point is calculated for each year between the year of retirement
with DI and age sixty-four. The formula for old age ATP is then applied to
actual as well as assumed points between ages sixteen and sixty-four. A
disability pension can be received from age sixteen. Eligibility requires cer-
tiﬁcation from a physician that an individual’s capacity to work is per-
manently reduced by at least 25 percent due to illness, physical or mental
incapacity, or so forth. To receive a full disability pension, working ability
must be completely lost, although an individual may also be awarded 25, 50,
or 75 percent DI, corresponding to diﬀerent degrees of lost ability to work.6
Between 1972 and 1991, disability pensions were also granted for labor
market reasons. The requirements then were that the individual was sixty
years old or more and had exhausted his right to unemployment insurance.
In practice, the strictness with which medical screening is applied varies
over time. When analyzing granting rates of diﬀerent local social insurance
oﬃces, it is also evident that it varies between diﬀerent parts of the coun-
try. The rules regarding eligibility for DI have been tightened considerably
through successive changes in legislation in July 1993, October 1995, and
January 1997.
Sickness Insurance
Sweden has universal sickness insurance covering all employees and
self-employed that is ﬁnanced through payroll taxes. This insurance pro-
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5. In addition to the public labor market insurance, which we will consider here, there are
negotiated occupational insurances for disability and long term sickness.
6. Before 1993, the levels were 50, 67, and 100 percent.vides compensation for foregone earnings to workers who are not able to
carry out their regular work due to temporary health problems. It has un-
dergone several changes over the time period covered by our data set.
Prior to the ﬁrst major reform in 1987, compensation was calculated on
the basis of annual earnings, but during the ﬁrst two weeks of illness, it
only covered foregone earnings during scheduled work time from the sec-
ond day in a sickness spell. After the reform, 90 percent of foregone earn-
ings up to the social security ceiling were compensated from the ﬁrst day
of a sickness spell. The second major reform took place in 1992 when em-
ployers had to take responsibility for sickness insurance during the ﬁrst
two weeks of a spell. The replacement level—the share of foregone earn-
ings replaced by the insurance—has been changed on several occasions
between 1983 and 1997. In 1993, the replacement level for long sickness
spells, which is most relevant for the purpose of this study, was reduced
from 90 to 80 percent of foregone earnings between days 91 and 365 in a
spell, and reduced to 70 percent after one year. In 1996, it was changed to
75 percent for all long-term spells, and as of 1998, it is 80 percent for all
spells.
Eligibility for compensation after seven days of a sickness spell requires
a certiﬁcate from a physician. The certiﬁcate then has to be renewed at least
every third month for continued compensation. A physician has to certify
that temporary illness does not permit the insured individual to perform
his regular work and that he will be able to return to the labor force after
recovery. Otherwise, the worker should be granted DI. The compensation
level of sickness insurance is higher than that of DI for most workers. This
implies that a worker has economic incentives to remain on sick leave,
rather than DI, even if the probability of returning to the labor force is very
low. The law does not stipulate an upper limit on the length of a sickness-
beneﬁt spell.
Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment insurance (UI) is twofold: One part consists of the same
amount for all unemployed workers, and the second depends on an insured
worker’s income level before he became unemployed. A worker is not eligi-
ble for the second part unless he belongs to an unemployment beneﬁt fund.
All members of labor unions automatically belong to an unemployment
beneﬁt fund. It is also possible to be a member of an unemployment beneﬁt
fund without being a union member, if the worker has the occupation cov-
ered.
Unemployed workers who actively search for a new job are eligible for
UI. Refusal to accept a “suitable” job oﬀer from the public employment
oﬃce might lead to exclusion from compensation. In general, a worker can
reject two, but must accept the third suitable job oﬀer. An unemployed
worker is entitled to UI compensation for 300 days up to age ﬁfty-ﬁve and
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ing programs, the compensation period can be renewed several times.
The compensation level is very similar to sickness insurance with one
important exception: The income ceiling of UI is lower. The UI ceiling is
not indexed: Changes in the ceiling are made on a discretionary basis by
the government. By the end of the period covered by our data (1997), the in-
come ceiling for UI was SKr199,650 compared to SKr272,250 for the price-
indexed social security ceiling used for sickness insurance. The changes
in the compensation level of sickness insurance, reported in the preced-
ing subsection, also apply to UI.
10.2.4 Income Taxes and Housing Allowances
Besides the eﬀect of the social security system, retirement incentives are
also aﬀected by income taxes.8 Sweden has an integrated income tax sys-
tem. Individuals pay local and national income taxes. The national gov-
ernment determines the tax base for national and local taxes. After a ma-
jor tax reform in 1991, the tax base is now divided into earned income and
capital income. All income from the social insurance system is included
in earned income along with wages and salaries. As of 1991, there is a
national proportional tax of 30 percent on taxable income from capital.
Earned income is taxed nationally and locally. The local tax rate is deter-
mined independently by each of Sweden’s 283 municipalities. Local tax
rates are clustered around 31 percent. Prior to 1991, the marginal tax rate
on pension income was aﬀected by capital income, since there was no divi-
sion of the tax base into earned income and capital income.
Local income taxes are proportional, while the national income tax is
progressive. After the 1991 tax reform, national income tax was set at (al-
most) zero below a certain point of earnings, and at 20 percent on all in-
come above that level. In 1995, the latter tax was temporarily increased to
25 percent. These rules may give the false impression that there are only
two possible marginal tax rates on earned income, but there is a basic de-
duction that varies among diﬀerent earned-income brackets. There are
also special rules for the basic deduction for old age pensioners, which
largely determine their marginal tax rates.
Old age, disability, and survivor’s pensioners with low income are enti-
tled to a housing allowance. In 1995, this allowance was, at most, 85 per-
cent of the housing cost up to a certain ceiling and above a certain ﬂoor.
It is reduced by 40 percent (45 percent at high-income levels) of income in
excess of a basic pension and special supplement and by 2 percent of
wealth. In 1994, about 30 percent of all old age pensioners received hous-
ing allowances, and the average amount was about SKr17,673—that is, 33
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7. This was changed to age ﬁfty-seven in December 1997.
8. See Aronsson and Walker (1997) for a detailed description of the Swedish tax system.percent of the amount of the lowest pension from the national pension
system.
10.2.5 Mandatory Retirement Rules on the Swedish Labor Market
Sweden has a normal retirement age of sixty-ﬁve.9Older workers are not
covered by employment security legislation,10 that is, workers older than
sixty-ﬁve are not covered by seniority rules and therefore are protected the
least if a ﬁrm wants to scale down. Furthermore, workers over sixty-ﬁve are
not entitled to UI. On the other hand, the wage cost for employers is lower
because they do not have to pay payroll-taxes to national or occupational
pension schemes for employees over sixty-ﬁve.
Central and local government employees automatically lose their jobs at
age sixty-ﬁve. Exceptions from this rule are permitted for one year. In the
private sector, collective agreements between the trade unions and the em-
ployers’ confederations as a rule also prescribe strict rules for mandatory
retirement at age sixty-ﬁve. As the number of these agreements is very
large, it is hard to get an overview of the overall strictness of the rules for
mandatory retirement.
10.2.6 Sources of Income after Retirement
As already indicated, the Swedish welfare system provides several op-
tions for early exit from the labor market. In order to gain an understand-
ing of to what extent these diﬀerent options are used, let us consider the co-
horts in our data set for persons born between 1927 and 1932. These are the
birth cohorts that had reached the normal retirement age of sixty-ﬁve in
1997 (the end of the period under study).
Table 10.2 shows the percentage share of workers in this subsample who
receive their main income (more than 50 percent of their total nonlabor in-
come) from one of ten diﬀerent sources of income after retirement. The last
row in the table indicates that none of the sources of income accounts for
more than 50 percent of the retired worker’s nonlabor income.
The sources of income listed in table 10.2 can be divided into three
groups. The ﬁrst group consists of schemes designed to serve as old age
pension programs: the state old-age pension (pathway 1), occupational pen-
sions (pathway 2), pensions provided by the employer or severance pay-
ments (pathway 6), private pensions (pathway 7), and partial retirement
beneﬁts provided by social security (pathway 10). The second group com-
prises insurance programs against income loss from poor health or un-
employment: DI (pathway 3), wife’s supplement (pathway 5), sickness in-
surance (pathway 8) and UI (pathway 9). In contrast to the ﬁrst group,
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9. Wadensjö (1989) discusses the implications of sixty-ﬁve as a normal retirement age.
10. Less than 5 percent of employees in the Swedish labor market are not covered by a cen-
tral agreement, and in which case, they are protected by employment security legislation un-
til age sixty-seven.claiming support from the sources in the second group is not a viable op-
tion for everyone, due to the health or unemployment requirements of the
programs. The third group contains only one source: survivor’s pension
(pathway 4).
According to table 10.2, the second insurance group accounts for about
35 percent of the male and about 40 percent of the female subsample.
Within this group, sickness insurance is the dominant initial source of
income: More than 20 percent of the men and 27 percent of the women.
In the ﬁrst (old age retirement) group, private pensions and employer-
provided pensions are relatively unimportant as the main source of income
of the newly retired.
To  study whether or not the initial path to retirement varies among
workers assigned to diﬀerent occupational pension schemes (i.e., diﬀerent
socioeconomic groups) we repeated the analysis above, but divided the
subsample into groups corresponding to assignment to diﬀerent occupa-
tional pension schemes. These results are shown in table 10.3.
It is evident from table 10.3 that there are large diﬀerences between
workers in diﬀerent occupational pension schemes. Blue-collar workers in
the private sector, covered by the STP scheme, are much more likely than
all other groups to receive their main initial income from sickness insur-
ance or UI. A further distinct result is that employees in the public sector,
both state and local government, are less likely to have their main income
from UI when they exit the labor force.
Since workers are able to switch between diﬀerent sources of income af-
ter permanent exit from the labor force, it may be misleading to describe
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Table 10.2 Percentage Share of the Pathways to Permanent Exit From the Labor
Market Showing Main Source of Income (more than 50% from the
indicated source) for Cohorts Born 1927–1932, by Gender
Pathway Men Women
1. State old age pension 33.70 26.99
2. Occupational pension 13.68 14.21
3. Disability pension 6.55 6.59
4. Survivor’s pension 0.00 3.99
5. Wife’s supplement 0.02 2.00
6. Severance payments from employer 0.60 0.69
7. Private pension 0.86 0.76
8. Sickness insurance 20.53 26.88
9. Unemployment insurance 8.35 6.42
10. Partial retirement beneﬁt 10.04 6.83
11. No income source  50% 5.67 4.64
Notes: The 10.02% of the male and the 6.11% of the female subsample not yet retired by the
end of the panel are included in pathway 1. Pathway 5 also includes some other minor bene-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.only the ﬁrst main source.11 Table 10.4 shows the percentage distributions
of the second main source of income for those who initially left the labor
market with sickness insurance or UI, the number of years they retain their
ﬁrst source, as well as the average number of years on their ﬁrst main
source of nonwork income. Since those who start to receive old age pen-
sion beneﬁts at retirement are most likely to continue to do so, and those
who leave the labor force with DI as their main source of income will au-
tomatically begin receiving old age pensions at age sixty-ﬁve; these groups
are excluded from the transitions listed in table 10.4.
According to table 10.4, most of those who initially had sickness-
insurance beneﬁts as their main income source receive a disability pension
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11. For example, we found 677 diﬀerent permutations of the main source of income after
retirement in our sample.
Table 10.4 Percentage Shares of Main Source of Income After a Spell with Sickness or
Unemployment Insurance After Permanent Exit From the Labor Market, with
Sickness and Unemployment Insurance, Respectively, as Main Source of Income
Before Transition (cohorts born 1927–1932)
Number of Years Living on First Main Income Source
Pathway 1 2 3 4 5+ Average
Sickness Insurance to:
State old age pension 12.00 62.18 22.44 10.90 3.85 0.64 1.59
Occupational pension 7.07 97.28 2.72 0 0 0 1.02





Unemployment insurance 5.11 93.98 3.01 2.26 0 0.75 1.50
Partial retirement beneﬁt 0.04
Mixed sources 12.76 42.17 39.76 11.45 5.12 1.50 1.84
No. of observations 2,601
Unemployment Insurance to:
State old age pension 47.64 27.94 39.69 18.54 7.05 6.79 2.26
Occupational pension 3.48 10.71 85.71 3.57 0 0 1.93




Private pension 14.18 45.61 44.74 7.89 1.75 0 1.66
Partial retirement beneﬁt 0.25
Mixed sources 12.56 30.69 54.46 8.91 3.96 1.98 1.92
No. of observations 804
Note: Blank cells indicate that data is not available.as their second main source. More than 70 percent of this group receive
sickness insurance only one or two years before the transition to DI.
The picture is somewhat more diverse for those who initially receive UI
beneﬁts as their main source of income. More than 45 percent switch to an
old age pension. Almost 70 percent of UI-beneﬁt recipients have a UI ben-
eﬁt prior to the transition to some other beneﬁt for one or two years. About
20 percent switch to a DI pension, and a considerable fraction, 14.18 per-
cent, switch to sickness-insurance beneﬁts as their next main source of in-
come.
Table 10.5 goes one step further and reports what happens after the
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Table 10.5 Percentage Share of Main Source of Income after Sickness or Unemployment
Insurance, and Mixed Sources of Income as Second Main Source after Permanent
Exit from the Labor Market (cohorts born 1927–1932)
Number of Years on Second Main Income Source
12 3 4 5 + A v erage
Sickness Insurance to Unemployment Insurance to:
State old age pension 29.96 89.47 2.63 7.89 0 0 1.18
Occupational pension 1.56
Disability insurance 55.47 94.37 4.23 0 0 1.41 1.10
Wife’s supplement 2.34
Mixed sources 10.94 100 0 0 0 0 1.00
No. of observations 128
Sickness Insurance to Mixed Sources to:
State old age pension 28.57 45.74 35.11 12.77 6.38 0 1.80
Occupational pension 1.82




No. of observations 328
Unemployment Insurance to Sickness Insurance to:
State old age pension 27.27 36.67 56.67 6.67 0 0 1.70
Occupational pension 0.91
Disability insurance 60.91 49.25 41.79 5.97 2.99 0 1.63
Wife’s supplement 0.91
Mixed sources 10.00
No. of observations 110
Unemployment Insurance to Mixed Sources to:
State old age pension 73.78 37.10 51.61 8.06 3.23 0 1.77
Occupational pension 1.19
Disability insurance 23.81 20.00 70.00 5.00 5.00 0 1.95
Sickness insurance 1.19
No. of observations 84
Note: Blank cells indicate that data is not available.states considered in table 10.4. Most of those who switch from sickness in-
surance (SI) to UI or from UI to SI, ended up with DI as their main source
of income. Table 10.5 also reveals that most of the second transitions took
place within one or two years.
The percentage distribution of the number of years during which retirees
received their main income from other sources and then started to receive
their main income from DI is reported in table 10.6. It is evident that those
who retire at relatively older ages make a faster transition to DI. Table 10.6
may also serve as a summary of the results previously obtained on transi-
tions between sources of income after permanent exit from the labor force.
It shows that a majority in most groups make the transition to DI within
two years after they retired.
Finally, ﬁgure 10.1shows the relation between retirement age and the av-
erage number of years before a worker receives DI as their main source of
income, provided that their initial main source was from one of the labor
market insurance programs. In particular, there is a very clear relationship
between age of exit from the labor force and the average number of years
with UI- or SI-beneﬁts.
In summary, this section showed that there is a great deal of heterogene-
ity in the way Swedish workers ﬁnance their retirement. Two important
conclusions emerge. First, pathways to retirement vary considerably be-
tween diﬀerent groups of workers. Blue-collar workers in the private sec-
tor, in particular, get their income from insurance against poor health or
unemployment after having permanently left the labor force to a much
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Table 10.6 Percentage Distribution of the Number of Years after Permanent Exit from the
Labor Force before Disability Insurance Becomes the Main Income Source (retirees
with initial income from sickness or unemployment insurance only)
Number of Years
1234 5 + A v e r a g e
Age 50–55
Sickness insurance 9.09 37.60 33.47 9.09 10.74 2.75
Unemployment insurance 0.00 7.69 30.77 15.38 46.15 4.00
All 8.91 35.66 3.33 9.30 12.79 2.81
Age 55–60
Sickness insurance 20.10 42.44 27.17 6.67 3.62 2.31
Unemployment insurance 3.92 40.20 38.24 13.73 3.92 2.74
No income source  50% 51.02 18.37 24.49 6.12 0.00 1.86
All 18.91 41.21 28.70 7.66 3.53 2.36
Age 60–65
Sickness insurance 49.31 40.79 9.95 0.00 0.00 1.60
Unemployment insurance 10.42 64.58 25.00 0.00 0.00 2.15
No income source  50% 75.56 18.89 5.56 0.00 0.00 1.30
All 49.74 39.48 10.78 0.00 0.00 1.61larger extent than other groups. Second, although a large share of workers
rely on SI and UI as their main source of income in the initial state after a
permanent exit from the labor force, most of them switch to DI after one
to two years. This period decreases with the age of retirement.
10.3 Research Background
Despite the importance of early retirement from the labor market, the
empirical research on retirement behavior is very meager in Swedish data.
The most ambitious attempt to formally model retirement choice is found
in Hansson-Brusewitz (1992). In the empirical part of his study, Hansson-
Brusewitz estimates a labor-supply model with joint decisions on the num-
ber of hours of work and labor force participation. Among other things, he
simulates the eﬀects on total labor supply of introducing a partial pension
scheme and replacing the ATP system with a scheme in which pensions
amount to 60 percent of average lifetime earnings. He found that the par-
tial retirement scheme has a positive eﬀect on total number of hours of
work. As regards the hypothetical reform of the ATP system, he found a
small positive eﬀect on hours of work but a small negative eﬀect on desired
retirement age.
Sundén (1994) studies to what extent changes in rules, in general, and the
introduction of the partial retirement beneﬁt, in particular, could account
for the changes in retirement behavior between 1974 and 1981, or to what
extent these changes rather could be attributed to changes in individual
Income Security Programs and Retirement in Sweden 597
Fig. 10.1 Average number of years after retirement before DI becomes the main
source of income; only workers with main initial source of income from insurancepreferences. She estimates a multinomial-logit model with four diﬀerent
retirement options and then decomposes the overall change in retirement
behavior between 1974 and 1981. She ﬁnds that most of the observed
changes could be attributed to preferences, that is, an estimated coeﬃcient
in the model. Changes in rules, reﬂected in variables in the model, have a
very small eﬀect.
Skogman Thoursie (1999) investigates whether or not economic incen-
tives aﬀect the probability that a disability pension will be granted. He used
a sample from the Swedish Level of Living Surveyand estimated a reduced-
form conditional-logit model. The diﬀerence between the predicted in-
come from DI and the predicted income from labor was used as a measure
of economic incentives. The results showed that a gain in predicted income
from DI, relative to income from labor, increases the probability that a
worker will exit the labor market with a disability pension. The interpreta-
tion of the result is that economic incentives do in fact aﬀect the number of
new disability pensions.
Wadensjö and Palmer (1996) compare disability policies in Sweden and
the Netherlands. Both countries have generous disability programs, which
provide major pathways to early exit from the labor market. Despite the sim-
ilarities, there is a higher labor force participation rate among older workers
in Sweden than in the Netherlands. The authors point to some peculiarities
in the Swedish labor market and disability policies that might account for
the diﬀerent outcomes. Among these distinctive features are the emphasis
on the “work principle” in Swedish social and labor market policy, the low
unemployment rates (until the recession in the 1990s), the possibilities (spe-
ciﬁc to Sweden) of combining work and pensions through partial beneﬁts,
and the vocational rather than medical focus of rehabilitation policy.
10.4 Data
10.4.1 The Data Set
We use the Longitudinal Individual Data panel data set (LINDA) re-
cently constructed by Statistics Sweden, the Department of Economics at
the University of Uppsala, and the National Social Insurance Board. The
LINDA is a pure-register sample, that is, no interviews were made when
the data were collected.
LINDA contains data from three main registers.
1. Income and Wealth Register (Inkomst- och Förmögenhetsstatistiken;
IoF): This income tax register consists of tax-return data on all people reg-
istered as taxpayers in Sweden. The LINDA contains data from this regis-
ter for each year between 1968 and 1997. For the years 1983 to 1997, the
IoF includes detailed data on taxable and nontaxable transfers based on
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for Educational Assistance, and some other authorities.
2. Population Census (Folk- och Bostadsräkningen; FoB): The FoB ex-
ists for every ﬁfth year between 1960 and 1990 and is obtained from mailed
questionnaires. Everyone living in Sweden is included in the FoB, and par-
ticipation in the census is compulsory.
3. The National Social Insurance Board Registers for pension points
(based on earnings): The LINDA contains data from this register for each
year between 1960 and 1997.
The LINDA also contains data on education from the National Educa-
tion Register and on employment from the National Labor Market Board
register.
The original sample for the LINDA panel is a random draw of 300,000
individuals from the 1995 IoF. The sampling procedure used to update the
panel backwards and forwards from 1995 is designed so that each yearly
cross section of LINDA is also a representative sample of the whole
Swedish population.
The LINDA panel also contains information on the spouse of each in-
dividual originally included in the sample. In general, the same variables
as for the original individuals are also available for their spouses. There
aretwo, somewhat diﬀerent, deﬁnitions of “spouse” in LINDA. The ﬁrst is
the tax-authority deﬁnition of spouses (samtaxerad) as either formally
married or as cohabiting and having common children. Information on
spouses according to this deﬁnition is available for each year between 1968
and 1997. The second deﬁnition refers to all spouses that have reported in
the mailed questionnaire that they are living together (i.e., share housing).
This information is only available for the years of the FoB. When calculat-
ing incentive variables for this analysis, we used the ﬁrst deﬁnition because
it is available for all years under study.
10.4.2 Sample Selection
For purpose of our study, we have restricted the population in several di-
mensions. First, the period of analysis is restricted to the years 1983 to
1997, primarily because the LINDA panel contains much more detailed in-
formation on individual sources of income for this period compared to the
period preceding 1983.
Second, the population is restricted to individuals born between 1927
and 1940, that is, those who were born in 1927 were age ﬁfty-six in 1983 and
seventy in 1997; those born in 1940 were age forty-three in 1983 and ﬁfty-
seven in 1997. Third, we have restricted the sample to those who had not
already permanently exited from the labor force at age ﬁfty. Table 10.7
shows the number of individuals remaining in the sample at diﬀerent stages
of the selection process.
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diﬀer from survey panels. There are two main sources of attrition: mortal-
ity and permanent emigration. Table 10.8 shows the number of individuals
remaining in the sample in diﬀerent years covered by the panel.
10.4.3 Measurement of Variables
Measuring Date of Retirement
As the data set only includes register information, there is no self-
assessed information on date of retirement. It does, however, contain de-
tailed information on sources of income for each individual in the sample.
The sources of income that enable workers to remain out of the labor force,
listed in table 10.2, enable us to indirectly measure the date of permanent
exit from the labor market (i.e., date of retirement). We investigated two
deﬁnitions for measuring full-time retirement.
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Table 10.7 Number of Individuals Remaining After Each Step in the
Sample Selection
Men Women Total
Individuals born 1927–1940 22,375 21,948 44,323
Neither emigrated nor dead in 1983 22,055 21,798 43,853
Usable earnings histories 22,046 21,781 43,827
Not retired at age 50 20,364 19,576 39,940
Not retired in 1983 18,163 15,916 34,079
Employed in 1983 15,619 14,820 30,439
Table 10.8 Number of Individuals Remaining in the Sample During the Period
Under Study
Men Women Total
1983 15,619 14,820 30,439
1984 15,578 14,812 30,390
1985 15,535 14,794 30,329
1986 15,479 14,775 30,254
1987 15,390 14,731 30,121
1988 15,325 14,698 30,023
1989 15,237 14,654 29,891
1990 15,144 14,612 29,756
1991 15,043 14,550 29,593
1992 14,914 14,495 29,409
1993 14,789 14,438 29,227
1994 14,664 14,363 29,027
1995 14,518 14,282 28,800
1996 14,370 14,194 28,564
1997 14,194 14,103 28,2971. Out of the labor force full time by source of income: An individual is
considered to be out of the labor force full time if, in a particular year, they
receive more than 80 percent of their income from the sources listed in
table 10.2.
2. Out of the labor force full time by earnings from labor:An individual is
considered to be out of the labor force full time if, in a particular year, he
has labor earnings of less than one BA.
This leads us to two diﬀerent deﬁnitions of date of retirement: (a) the
year preceding the ﬁrst year an individual is out of the labor force full time,
according to the source-of-income deﬁnition, and remains so for the rest
of the period covered by the panel or (b) the year preceding the ﬁrst year
an individual is out of the labor force full time, according to the earnings-
from-labor deﬁnition, and remains so for the rest of the period covered by
the panel.12
These two deﬁnitions of retirement are compared in table 10.9, which
shows the distribution in percentage shares of the diﬀerence between the
age of retirement resulting from two measures. The results are shown for
four subsamples by age group for retirement according to the earnings-
from-labor deﬁnition.
Table 10.9 shows that there are diﬀerences between the two measures.
First, there is a thick clustering of observations in the 0 and –1 columns. A
relatively simple explanation as to why the earnings-from-labor measure
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12. An obvious problem with this way of measuring date of retirement is that workers who
are regarded as retired could in fact have returned to the labor market after 1997 (the last year
included in the panel)—that is, on average, we will underestimate the date of retirement and
the degree of underestimation is positively correlated to the date of retirement.
Table 10.9 Diﬀerence in Years Between Age of Permanent Exit From the Labor
Force Using the Earnings-From-Labor (deﬁnition 2) Measure of
Retirement and Source-of-Income Deﬁnition (deﬁnition 1), by Gender
and Age Group of Retirement (source-of-income deﬁnition)
Diﬀerence (years)
Gender and Age  –3 –2 –1 0 1 2  3
Men
50–55 10.67 4.94 37.58 44.27 2.23 0.32 0.00
55–60 7.89 2.12 34.66 51.56 2.46 0.81 0.50
60–65 2.75 1.24 29.26 61.73 3.87 0.60 0.55
65–70 1.24 0.13 14.76 74.06 5.66 2.02 2.15
Women
50–55 16.47 7.72 37.83 36.80 1.19 0.00 0.00
55–60 11.34 4.96 38.46 43.54 1.10 0.53 0.08
60–65 4.47 2.26 38.76 52.98 1.14 0.14 0.26
65–70 2.84 0.69 21.86 72.03 1.81 0.60 0.17gives a retirement age one year before the source-of-income measure is that
a worker is likely to earn more than one BA the year he retires—unless he
does not retire until the end of the year. Therefore, as indicated above, we
have set the year of retirement at the year before the worker starts to per-
manently earn less than 1 BA from labor.
Likewise, it is very likely that labor income exceeds 20 percent of total in-
come the year a worker retires. Consequently, we set the year of retirement
at the year before the worker starts to permanently receive less than 20 per-
cent of his income from labor. For the majority of individuals in our
sample, one BA is larger than 20 percent of income. If, due to the timing of
retirement during the year, earnings fell between 20 percent and one BA, a
one-year diﬀerence between the two measures is recorded.
Second, there are relatively many observations in the  –3 column. These
workers reach the earnings-from-labor criterion three or more years before
the source-of-income deﬁnition, that is, they have several years with earn-
ings from labor below one BA but exceeding 20 percent of total income.
There are several explanations for such observations. They can refer to par-
tially retired low-income workers (those who live on their own savings) or
on the income of other members of the household, which is probably more
common. Another possibility is that workers exit from the regular labor
market and enter the informal sector of the economy. Such individuals ap-
pear more frequently in the female subsample and, more importantly, in
the age group that, according to the earnings-from-labor measure, retired
early.  These groups represent very few observations: the ﬁgure of 16.47
percent for women who retired between ages ﬁfty and ﬁfty-ﬁve in the  –3
column corresponds to only sixty-three observations.
Moreover, table 10.9 shows that a considerable share of the individuals
who retire after age sixty-ﬁve, according to the earnings-from-labor crite-
rion, had retired according to the source-of-income criterion two or more
years earlier. In other words, they continued to work part time after retire-
ment while simultaneously receiving their main income from old age pen-
sion beneﬁts. There is no earnings test in Sweden’s old age pension schemes
(i.e., it is possible to receive full pension beneﬁts and continue to work).
The decision to retire (i.e., leave the labor force) and the decision to claim
a beneﬁt are separate. Table 10.9 shows that almost 10 percent of the men
who retired between ages sixty-ﬁve and seventy according to the earnings-
from-labor deﬁnition claimed a beneﬁt at an earlier age. Women did this
to a considerably smaller extent. In the case of high-income workers, the
source-of-income deﬁnition might be more appropriate, since earnings
above one BA correspond to relatively few hours of work.
To conclude the comparison between the two deﬁnitions of full-time re-
tirement, let us ﬁrst note that the resemblance between the two measures
of retirement seems to be good for most individuals in the sample. How-
ever, the source-of-income deﬁnition missed that some individuals, pri-
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beneﬁts from any of the programs considered in table 10.2. Also, some in-
dividuals, primarily men, remain in the labor market part time at a rela-
tively old age, but are still measured as retired full time by the source-of-
income deﬁnition of retirement. These two disparities imply that the
earnings-from-labor deﬁnition of retirement is more useful, and we re-
strict ourselves to using this deﬁnition when describing the transition to
full-time retirement.
Measuring Other Included Variables
We used the extensive earnings histories as well as information on the in-
comes of spouses included in LINDA to calculate the economic incentive
for remaining in the labor force. Here, there are two problems associated
with using the earnings-from-labor variable. First, some of the observa-
tions are missing. This could be due to the fact that a worker is temporar-
ily out of the labor force or out of the country. In such cases, we simply
imputed the missing earnings observation by taking the average of the
surrounding observations or, if the missing observations are from the be-
ginning of the observed period of time, we imputed the missing observa-
tion by taking the average of the ﬁrst three earnings observations.
Second, and more importantly, when a worker retires, the contrafactual
earnings from labor cannot be observed. Nevertheless, this earnings level
is, of course, important for the retirement decision, and (as discussed in
section 10.5.5) it is required in order to calculate the incentive measures. To
predict future earnings, we simply take the average of earnings over the last
three years of a worker’s observed earnings records indexed by the CPI.
Lifetime earnings are measured as the sum of the constant and the ﬁxed
eﬀect, from a ﬁxed-eﬀects regression on labor earnings between 1983 and
1997 on age, age squared, and dummy variables for each year included. The
same strategy is used for measuring lifetime earnings for the spouse.
Our data set does not contain any direct information that speciﬁes to
which occupational pension scheme each individual belongs. Given the
importance of occupational pension schemes, this is, of course, essential
information. However, as described in section 10.2, occupational pension
schemes are associated with the diﬀerent trade unions, which, in turn, are
associated with diﬀerent personnel categories and sectors of the economy.
The FoBs contain information on the sector in which each individual
works as well as socioeconomic group. This information can then be used
to predict to which occupational pension scheme each individual belongs.
We use information from the FoBs (censuses) in 1980, 1985, and 1990. If
an individual has retired by the date of a census, it does not contain any in-
formation on either their socioeconomic group or sector of employment.
This means that there is less information missing from the 1980 census
compared to the other two censuses. Therefore, we used the 1980 census to
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this census, we used information from the 1985 census and, if necessary,
also from the 1990 census. The resulting distribution among occupational
schemes is shown in table 10.10.
We used the same strategy to measure individual education level. In the
ﬁrst place, we used information from the 1993 education register. For miss-
ing observations, we used data from the 1994, 1995, and 1995 registers, re-
spectively. Table 10.11 gives a short description of each education level
along with the percentage share of observations in each category.
Finally, we used controls for place of residence. Sweden is divided into
twenty-ﬁve counties, and LINDA contains annual information on in
which county an individual is registered for local taxes; this is the measure
used for place of residence.
10.5 Construction of Incentive Measures
10.5.1 Deﬁnitions of the Incentive Measures
We use four diﬀerent measures of economic incentives for retirement de-
cisions:
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Table 10.10 Classiﬁcation of Individuals into Pension Schemes
Men Women Total
Number % Number % Number %
Private sector
Blue-collar 6,188 39.62 3,137 21.17 9,325 30.64
White-collar 4,972 31.83 2,614 17.64 7,586 24.92
Government employees
Central 2,110 13.51 2,348 15.84 4,458 14.65
Local 2,349 15.04 6,721 45.35 9,070 29.80
All 15,619 100.00 15,165 100.00 30,439 100.00
Table 10.11 Number of Observations at Diﬀerent Education Levels (%)
Level Description Men Women
1 Compulsory school only (7 or 8 years) 42.58 35.63
2J unior secondary school (9 or 10 years) 4.44 8.24
3V ocational school  2 years 20.06 33.06
4 Upper secondary school  3 years; sixth form of 
comprehensive school (U.K.); senior high school (U.S.) 14.61 4.71
5P ost-upper secondary school  2 years; junior college 
(U.S.), e.g., nursing school 7.35 9.03
6P ost-upper secondary school  3 years, e.g., business 
administration, engineering or medicine, and PhDs 10.96 9.331. Beneﬁt accrual,
2. Eﬀective tax or subsidy rate,
3. Peak value, and
4. Option value.
Beneﬁt accrual measures the increase in pension wealth that a worker
gains by postponing retirement and the claiming of beneﬁts for one year.
The present value of a worker’s pension wealth at year t if he retires at age
r is deﬁned as
(2) SSW(r, t)   ∑
max age
s r
 s tEtB(s, r),
where   is the discount factor and EtB(s, r) is the expected beneﬁt at age s
if the worker retires at age r. The expected beneﬁt is deﬁned as
(3) EtB(s, r)   p(st)q(st)BM(s, r)   p(st)[1   q(st)]BS(s, r) 
  [1   p(st)]q(st)S(s, r, t),
where BM(s, r) is the worker’s pension beneﬁt at age s if they are married
and retire at age r; BS(s, r) is the worker’s pension beneﬁt at age sif they are
not married and retire at age r; S(s, r) is the survivor’s beneﬁt when the
worker would have been aged s and retired at age r; p(st) is the probabil-
ity of survival at time s conditional on survival at time t; and q(st) is the
probability of the spouse surviving at age s conditional on survival at age t.
The value S(s, r, t) depends on the spouse at time t as well as the retirement
age r, while BM(s, r) and BS(s, r) are not dependent on t, since we assume
perfect foresight about wages.
The beneﬁt accrual at age t is deﬁned as
(4) ACCR(t)   ∑
man age
s t 2
 s tEtB(s, t   2)   ∑
max age
s t 1
 s tEtB(s, t   1).
The eﬀective-tax-or-subsidy-rate measure relates beneﬁt accrual to the
net wage if the worker stays in the labor market one additional year, that is,













where W(t   1) denotes labor earnings at age t   1.
Peak value is deﬁned as social security wealth (SSW) at its maximum
value minus SSW at time t, that is,
(6) PEAK(t)   
r t 2,t 
max
3, .... .71  ∑
max age
s r
 s tEtB(s, r)   ∑
max age
s t 1
 s tEtB(s, t   1) .
This measure is forward looking in the sense that it not only takes into
account the immediate accrual in SSW of working an additional year, but
also the accruals in future years.
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cision also depends on how they value consumption and leisure at diﬀer-
ent ages. At any given age (t), it is assumed that the worker compares the
expected present value of retiring at that age with the value of retiring at
each age (r) in the future.
The expected utility at age t of retiring at age r is deﬁned as
V(t, r)  ∑
r 1
s t
 s t[Y(s) ]p(st)   ∑
max age
s r
 s t[kB(s, r)] p(st),
where   is the subjective discount rate, k reﬂects the marginal utility of
leisure, and   measures marginal utility of consumption. The option value
of retiring at age t is
(7) OPT(t)   V(t, r∗)   V(t, t   1),
where r∗ is the optimal retirement age; that is, the option value can be in-
terpreted as the loss in utility of retiring today rather than preserving the
option to retire at the preferred age.
All of these incentive measures abstract from the possibility of retiring
without claiming a beneﬁt and of claiming a beneﬁt without retiring. In an
expanded model, an individual who is not retired and does not claim a ben-
eﬁt in one year could choose between four options the next year.
1. Continue to work and not claim a beneﬁt
2. Retire and start claiming a beneﬁt
3. Retire without claiming a beneﬁt
4. Claim a beneﬁt without retiring
Here we continue to abstract from the numerous possibilities of partial
retirement in the Swedish system. In a utility-maximizing framework, it is
conceptually straightforward to take all four options into account. How-
ever, this approach complicates the retirement model considerably and,
considering the extent to which our data are dominated by options 1 and
2, we do not think it is justiﬁed.
The fact that we have relatively few observations on options 3 and 4 may
be explained by the progressive income tax, which creates an incentive to
smooth income over time. To the extent that options 3 and 4 are dominated
by 1 and 2, they can be disregarded, as we do in our model.
10.5.2 Sources of Income after Retirement
As pointed out in section 10.2, workers may use several diﬀerent sources
of income provided by the Swedish social insurance system after having
permanently left the labor force. Moreover, diﬀerent sources of income
also implied varying income levels after retirement. In general, the re-
placement levels from DI and from UI and SI, in particular, are signiﬁ-
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explained in section 10.2, these sources of income are not available to all
workers. It is only possible to observe ex post that an individual who actu-
ally receives support from a particular insurance is eligible for it. Whether
or not an individual who continues to work one additional year is, in fact,
qualiﬁed for beneﬁts from a particular program cannot be determined.
This complicates the construction of the incentive measures, since they are
based on expected income after retirement.
An extreme way of handling this problem is to assume that each worker,
at each point of time, is eligible for support from the program that provides
the most generous support. However, since this does not apply to some of
the workers in the sample, such a measure would overestimate the true in-
come after retirement for some of the workers, thereby underestimating the
eﬀect of economic incentives. Another extreme would be to assume that
the old age pension is the only alternative available. But this would cer-
tainly not apply to those workers who are aﬀected by the economic incen-
tives inherent in labor market insurance, also thereby underestimating the
eﬀect of the economic incentives.
A third alternative would be to assume that insurance is an alternative
available only to those who, in fact, claim some kind of insurance when re-
tiring. This procedure, however, would give rise to an endogeneity prob-
lem. If the retirement income from an insurance program, which is consid-
erably higher than that from an old age pension, were assigned only at the
point in time when a worker actually retired, and not in the preceding time
period, it would be recorded as an increase in retirement income for the
year retirement actually take place. This, in turn, would imply that the ef-
fect of economic incentives is overestimated.
To avoid the problems involved in these approaches, we used a “proba-
bilistic” or instrumental variable (IV) approach. To explain how the incen-
tive measures are calculated using this approach, let us take SSW as an ex-
ample; SSW from the old age pension system, which is available without
any requirements regarding health status or unemployment, is denoted
SSWOAP. A worker’s SSW, if they are eligible for labor market insurance, is
denoted SSWLI. If the worker’s probability of access at a particular point
in time is p, then their SSW can be written
(8) SSW   SSW OAP   p(SSWLI   SSW OAP).
Calculating this measure involves two problems. The ﬁrst concerns cal-
culation of SSWLI. Not only does Sweden’s welfare system oﬀer several
diﬀerent labor market insurance programs, but workers are also able to
shift between diﬀerent programs. Ideally, SSWLI should be divided to ac-
count for diﬀerent systems with a probability assigned to eligibility for
each of them. However, as noted in section 10.2, considering all permu-
tations of the main source of income over time resulted in 677 diﬀerent
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culate the economic incentive measures for hundreds of pathways.
Several simpliﬁcations can be made, however. For example, a behavioral
model could be applied to predict how workers choose among diﬀerent
insurance programs. On the other hand, according to section 10.2, most
workers who retire by claiming labor market insurance follow a similar pat-
tern. So, rather than applying a behavioral model, we used a common, syn-
thetic “insurance path” to approximate the shifts between diﬀerent insur-
ance programs over time.
It was noted in section 10.2 that the replacement rates for SI and UI are
quite similar, particularly for workers who have an insured income below
both the social security and the UI ceilings. This applies to most of the
blue-collar workers in our sample for most of the time period under study.
These are also the workers that are the most likely to initially ﬁnance their
retirement from insurance. Thus, the accuracy in predicting income after
retirement it is not likely to be impaired if, when choosing between SI and
UI, the “right” insurance program is not used.
As shown in ﬁgure 10.1, the length of the time before the transition to DI
is highly dependent on a worker’s age when they permanently leave the
labor force. In constructing the synthetic insurance path to retirement, we
therefore use retirement age as a predictor of the length of the period with
UI or SI before the transition to DI. In ﬁgure 10.2, predicted values from
ar egression of the average number of years with SI or DI before DI on a
quadratic function of retirement age are added to the data shown in ﬁgure
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Fig. 10.2 Fitted values from regressing the average number of years with sickness or
unemployment insurance as the main source of income before DI becomes the main
source on a quadratic function in retirement age along with actual sample averages10.1. As is apparent from the ﬁgure, the function gives a very good ﬁt to the
observed averages.13
When calculating the incentives measures, we assume—for each age—
that a worker receives SI or UI with a replacement rate of 80 percent dur-
ing the number of years predicted by the quadratic function and, after that
point, shifts to DI as their main source of income. Beginning at age sixty-
ﬁve, no workers are eligible for any type of labor market insurances, and
consequently, all incentive measures are calculated using the old age pen-
sion alternative only.
The second main problem with using the IV, or probability approach,
concerns assigning the probability of being eligible for labor market in-
surance. Ideally, we would like to know, for each point in time, every
worker’s probability of being eligible for labor market insurance. Since
this information is not available, we estimated a probit equation where the
dependent variable is the observed take-up rate of the labor market insur-
ance programs. The speciﬁcation of the probit equation is a polynomial in
age, indicators for six education levels, indicators for four socioeconomic
groups, marital status, and indicators for the twenty-ﬁve diﬀerent coun-
ties in Sweden. The results from the probit regression are shown in table
10.12.
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13. As there are very few observations on retirement before age ﬁfty-four and as the esti-
mated function actually increases between retirement ages ﬁfty-two and ﬁfty-three, we used
2.75 years up to age ﬁfty-four. After that age, we applied the quadratic function.
Table 10.12 Probit Estimates of Probability of Getting Disability, Sickness, or
Unemployment Insurance Beneﬁts
Men Women
   /s     /s 
Age 0.444 7.71 0.088 45.69
Age2 –0.003 –6.20 0.00 0.00
Occ2 –0.253 –13.37 –0.255 –0.03
Occ3 –0.148 –6.05 –0.140 –5.89
Occ4 –0.214 –8.68 –0.189 –9.89
Occ5 –0.214 –8.50 –0.237 –6.09
Occ6 –0.290 –7.56 –0.404 –7.63
Elev2 0.119 3.60 –0.066 –2.45
Elev3 0.075 4.26 –0.051 –2.99
Elev4 –0.035 –1.05 –0.077 –2.16
Elev5 –0.151 –4.60 –0.201 –6.80
Elev6 –0.281 –8.88 –0.339 –10.64
Intercept –17.03 –10.28 –6.853 –59.70
Controls for counties Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.0761 0.0717
Notes: Occ   socioeconomic group; Elev   education level.10.5.3 Calculating Retirement Income Components and Income Taxes
Calculations of the incentive measures for the individuals in the sample
require calculating the old age pension, DI, SI, and UI beneﬁts for each in-
dividual at every possible retirement age. It is also imperative that income
taxes and housing allowances be taken into account. The frequent changes
that have taken place in the Swedish system for housing allowances and in-
come taxes not only require some approximations, but also raise issues
about expectations.
The most straightforward component to calculate in the economic in-
centive measures is income from the deﬁned-beneﬁt pension schemes—
that is, the state basic and supplementary pension (ATP) and the four main
occupational-pension schemes. Compared to income taxes, for example,
the rules for these pension schemes do not change very often, and given the
detailed earnings histories in our data set, we were able to calculate these
incomes accurately.
For the deﬁned-contribution schemes—ITPK, the central government
employees’ supplementary pension, and the post-reform pension scheme
for blue-collar workers in the private sector—the size of the pension de-
pends on the return of the particular fund that each may choose to manage
their pension. Calculating the hypothetical outcome for these pensions
therefore involves approximations. As regards the ITPK scheme, we used
an algorithm for calculating the size of the pension provided by the insur-
ance company (called SPP), which administers the largest share of the
ITPK pensions. As suggested by SPP, we used an annual interest rate of
2.25 percent (net after taxes and administrative costs).
We used the same algorithm for the supplementary pension scheme for
central government employees, while taking into account that a lower
share of the wage sum that is paid into the pension scheme compared to the
ITPK, as well as the fact that this scheme went into eﬀect after ITPK. In
the case of the postreform pension scheme for blue-collar workers in the
private sector, we used an algorithm provided by the company, which man-
ages the largest share of these pensions.
The calculations with respect to income taxes are more complicated. Al-
though there has only been one major reform of the Swedish income tax
system during the period covered by our data, several year-to-year changes
have taken place. Since the number of years included is quite large, con-
sidering all changes would be unrealistic. To simplify matters, we chose an
approximate strategy. We began by regressing the amount of taxes on tax-
able income. Since income tax rates are diﬀerent for people still in the la-
bor force compared to retirees, we have estimated separate functions for
retired and nonretired. We used a third degree polynomial to model the
marginal tax rates in the prereform income tax system and three linear seg-
ments for the postreform marginal tax rates. We then used the estimated
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was applied for housing allowances.
The forward-looking measures—peak value and option value—require
the worker to compare expected income among all possible retirement
ages. This implies predicting hypothetical individual labor earnings after
the workers had actually retired. For these calculations, we chose a latest
possible retirement age of seventy-one. This, in turn, requires predicting
labor earnings up until year 2010. For these out-of-sample predictions, we
used the same strategy as outlined in section 10.4, that is, we took the three-
year averages for the years preceding the year with missing labor earnings.
All three incentive measures used in this study involve individual expec-
tations on future net income streams, which to a large extent are aﬀected
by future changes in beneﬁts and income taxes. For example, the economic
incentives for a retirement decision in the late 1980s are aﬀected by
whether or not an individual anticipated the 1991 income tax reform, and
we assume that it was anticipated. Another example is the occupational
pension scheme for blue-collar workers in the private sector. The trade
union and the employers confederation agreed on a new pension scheme in
1996. However, another new agreement went into eﬀect on 1 January 2000,
and the pensions of some workers were aﬀected retroactively. Needless to
say, it is impossible to know which changes the workers anticipated. We
assume that they anticipated all changes until 1 January 2000, but none
thereafter.
10.5.4 Sample Estimates of Diﬀerent Incentives Measures
Tables 10.13–10.16 report the sample distribution of the incentive mea-
sures by age. Table 10.13 shows SSW, beneﬁt accrual, and the tax or sub-
sidy rate, that is, beneﬁt accrual as a share of labor earnings minus payroll
and income taxes in the individual’s last year of work. Table 10.14 reports
the peak value and option value distributions for men. Tables 10.15 and
10.16 list the corresponding distributions for women. In addition to the
median, the tenth and ninetieth percentiles of the distribution are given for
the beneﬁt accrual, peak value, and option value measures.
Beneﬁt accrual exhibits a marked increase at age ﬁfty-seven. This is due
to the rule in the STP scheme that at least three years of work between ages
ﬁfty-ﬁve and ﬁfty-nine are required in order to be eligible for the STP pen-
sion. The increase is also more marked regarding the median in the male
subsample because a larger share of the male labor force comprises blue-
collar workers. The next, noticeable increase is at age ﬁfty-nine. This may
be explained by the way the pension schemes for central and local govern-
ment employees are constructed (see section 10.2). This spike is substan-
tially more marked in the female subsample, mainly because the largest
share of the female labor force in Sweden works in the local government
service sector.
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(1995 SKr; CPI used as deﬂator)
Accrual
Last Age SSW 10th 90th Tax Subsidy Previous
of Work Median Median Percentile Percentile SD Rate Median Volume
55 1,067,750 14,863 –14,914 47,384 71,558 0.225 0.231
56 1,103,079 15,260 –15,693 53,690 72,946 0.220 0.221
57 1,145,999 38,432 –8,627 127,339 86,832 0.072 0.056
58 1,230,600 10,210 –18,052 45,075 76,746 0.250 0.153
59 1,278,554 11,004 –20,526 109,772 100,362 0.249 0.146
60 1,332,801 –2,452 –31,416 39,160 77,248 0.330 0.350
61 1,369,422 –11,171 –37,200 26,246 72,601 0.392 0.358
62 1,402,465 –19,918 –46,657 13,460 59,917 0.457 0.253
63 1,427,187 –28,814 –63,317 –5,090 58,197 0.520 0.290
64 1,447,386 –24,106 –59,611 –4,044 53,811 0.478 0.313
65 1,471,473 –23,631 –90,149 –7,890 58,009 0.177 0.036
66 1,500,672 –31,293 –72,891 –19,904 39,608 0.232 0.085
67 1,525,269 –39,412 –74,802 –29,946 27,395 0.291 0.128
68 1,545,787 –47,679 –83,300 –38,275 25,987 0.359 0.169
69 1,561,635 –56,298 –100,704 –46,628 24,605 0.440 0.193
70 1,571,791
Note: SD   standard deviation.
Table 10.14 Forward-Looking Incentive Measures (peak value and option value) for Men, by
Age (1995 SKr; CPI used as deﬂator)
Option Value Peak Value
Last Age 10th 90th 10th 90th
of Work Median Percentile Percentile SD Median Percentile Percentile SD
55 45,950 15,156 79,966 29,275 111,968 2,283 310,487 167,153
56 39,521 12,921 69,369 26,296 102,906 4,108 280,804 156,075
57 33,227 11,155 60,132 23,560 99,200 3,822 254,886 146,097
58 19,618 3,877 46,890 21,475 34,187 –14,539 210,786 138,783
59 12,822 1,656 36,711 18,752 20,638 –18,041 176,940 126,933
60 4,688 –1,798 19,721 13,949 –727 –30,358 83,890 98,434
61 1,768 –2,810 12,560 11,557 –10,308 –36,314 46,448 84,042
62 –38 –3,895 7,866 9,380 –19,595 –45,173 21,454 69,578
63 –1,316 –5,441 4,480 7,992 –28,504 –61,698 –1,070 61,668
64 –727 –5,080 2,968 6,501 –23,711 –55,125 –2,489 51,264
65 –1,033 –8,973 1,457 6,194 –23,624 –90,065 –7,876 52,730
66 –2,149 –6,211 –413 4,362 –31,287 –72,446 –19,893 39,478
67 –3,394 –6,652 –1,874 2,748 –39,412 –74,802 –29,946 27,395
68 –4,609 –8,248 –3,113 2,443 –47,679 –83,300 –38,275 25,987
69 –5,862 –9,800 –4,380 2,276 –56,298 –100,704 –46,628 24,605
Notes: SD   standard deviation. Parameter values for option value measure   0.97,   0.75, and 
k   4.7.Table 10.15 Social Security Wealth, Beneﬁt Accrual, and Tax or Subsidy Rate for
Women, by Age (1995 SKr; CPI used as deﬂator)
Accrual
Last Age SSW 10th 90th Tax Subsidy
of Work Median Median Percentile Percentile SD Rate Median
55 827,876 13,359 –4,465 33,588 27,906 0.174
56 861,445 13,758 –5,362 34,854 29,790 0.170
57 898,823 19,745 –2,612 71,591 36,585 0.111
58 945,692 12,815 –7,463 35,116 34,400 0.171
59 981,653 16,637 –19,034 115,672 65,566 0.132
60 1,039,325 5,127 –21,227 39,044 35,988 0.253
61 1,071,957 –2,507 –26,163 31,383 32,331 0.328
62 1,095,325 –11,511 –34,581 23,540 30,403 0.420
63 1,113,421 –16,910 –49,134 15,471 32,297 0.495
64 1,126,691 –14,378 –45,515 23,469 33,250 0.443
65 1,143,643 –12,733 –76,788 7,313 43,044 0.186
66 1,143,224 –16,525 –54,609 –4,154 26,593 0.204
67 1,144,681 –20,105 –43,002 –12,120 18,995 0.231
68 1,137,244 –25,737 –45,050 –18,568 16,415 0.275
69 1,137,490 –32,298 –47,004 –21,987 17,032 0.324
70 1,158,467
Note: SD   standard deviation.
Table 10.16 Forward-Looking Incentive Measures (peak value and option value) for Women, by
Age (1995 SKr; CPI used as deﬂator)
Option Value Peak Value
Last Age 10th 90th 10th 90th
of Work Median Percentile Percentile SD Median Percentile Percentile SD
55 55,472 31,397 78,714 19,403 107,531 3,356 280,500 125,036
56 50,667 28,052 72,457 18,227 97,138 2,522 258,400 116,511
57 45,767 24,544 66,102 17,016 88,609 2,547 239,264 108,763
58 39,903 20,487 58,841 15,699 56,027 –2,275 205,810 100,545
59 34,936 17,085 52,382 14,368 43,210 –11,355 182,714 92,363
60 28,565 12,420 44,776 12,835 10,656 –19,482 107,011 66,102
61 24,400 9,976 39,244 11,537 –275 –25,322 74,868 53,948
62 20,704 7,937 33,919 10,177 –9,347 –34,069 51,408 47,330
63 17,598 5,996 29,139 8,934 –15,506 –47,250 34,902 42,157
64 14,823 4,935 24,545 7,541 –12,558 –42,778 28,088 37,060
65 11,896 3,265 20,120 6,390 –12,290 –75,789 7,746 43,266
66 9,574 2,502 15,913 5,053 –16,523 –53,451 –4,115 26,639
67 7,146 1,622 11,744 3,857 –20,090 –43,002 –12,098 19,004
68 4,693 893 7,663 2,689 –25,723 –45,015 –18,539 16,407
69 2,316 454 4,040 1,611 –32,298 –47,004 –21,987 17,061
Notes: SD   standard deviation. Parameter values for option value measure   0.97,   0.75, and 
k   1.25.The forward-looking incentive measures, peak value and option value,
show—although on diﬀerent levels—a similar pattern as they both decrease
over the observed ages. However, the quantiles of the option value measure
evolve more smoothly over the ages, which is not surprising given the way in
which it is calculated. The ninetieth percentiles of the peak value fall con-
siderably between ages ﬁfty-nine and sixty, which, again, reﬂects the makeup
of the pension schemes for central and local governments employees.
The last column in table 10.13 gives the tax or subsidy rates obtained in
Palme and Svensson (1999) for a representative worker born in 1930, as-
signed to the STP occupational pension scheme, and a median income
earner throughout their working career. As can be seen in the table, the tax
rates are somewhat higher in the data set used here. This may be explained
by diﬀerences in the way these two sets of tax rates were obtained.
First, in Palme and Svensson (1999), labor market insurance was not
considered in the base case. This may explain the diﬀerent general levels up
to age sixty-three since this type of insurances entails more generous re-
placement rates compared to old age pension. Second, the representative
worker was assumed to be assigned to the STP pension scheme. The dip in
the tax rate at age ﬁfty-six is deﬁnitely related to the way this pension
scheme is constructed, which is less marked in the present data set that
comprises individuals from all occupational pension schemes. Third, the
data set now used encompasses the prereform income tax system up until
1991 with substantially higher marginal tax rates. This diﬀerence may ex-
plain the somewhat higher tax rates after age sixty-three. Finally, the re-
sults from the present data set are medians from the distribution of tax
rates, rather than tax rates from the median income earner. The direction
in which this diﬀerence works is not clear.
10.6 Empirical Model and Results
10.6.1 Empirical Speciﬁcation
We use the following empirical speciﬁcation for the retirement decision
model:
(9) Rit    0    1ACCit    2SSW it    3AGEit    4PREARNit    5EARNit
   6PREARNit   EARNit  7SPEARNit      Xit   vit,
where ACCit is the measure of accrual at time t; SSW it is the net present
value of SSW discounted back to time t; AGEit represents the individual’s
age either by a linear variable or by indicators for each age; PREARN is
the individual’s predicted earnings at time tand the square of this measure;
EARN is a measure of the individual’s lifetime earnings and its square;
SPEARN is lifetime earnings of the spouse, its square, and the spouse’s net
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variables, including marital status, education level (1–6),14 socioeconomic
group (1–4),15 and indicators for each of Sweden’s twenty-ﬁve counties (cf.
section 10.4 for the construction of these variables).
The focus of our interest is on the dual eﬀect of economic incentives for
retirement created by the social security system. Higher SSW will increase
an individual’s demand for all goods—including leisure time (i.e., retire-
ment). This eﬀect is measured by SSW, and we expect a positive sign on this
variable. However, if the accrual from working one additional year is suﬃ-
ciently large, then the substitution eﬀect, induced by the accrual, will dom-
inate the income eﬀect, and the worker will choose to continue to work.
Therefore we expect the sign on ACC to be negative. As explained in sec-
tion 10.5, we use three diﬀerent measures of accrual: beneﬁt accrual, peak
value, and option value.
Among the changes in the Swedish income tax and security systems
outlined in section 10.2, the following are particularly helpful for identi-
ﬁcation of the empirical model: the income tax reform (1991); the reform
of the occupational pension scheme for central government employees
(1992); the maturing of the fully funded supplementary pension scheme for
white-collar workers in the private sector (ITPK, in 1977) and for central
government employees (1991); and the transition from a STP to a fully
funded pension scheme for blue-collar workers in the private sector (1996).
Although the data set has a panel structure, identiﬁcation of the empir-
ical model prevents us from using, for example, a ﬁxed-eﬀect approach to
control for unobserved heterogeneity. We use the data set as a cross section
in the estimation and use observable demographic characteristics to con-
trol for heterogeneity. This means that most individuals are included in the
data several times. To correct the standard errors for dependence between
diﬀerent observations on the same individual, we use the Huber-White
sandwich estimator, which allows for general dependence within clusters of
observations.
10.6.2 Sample Characteristics
Since only workers older than age ﬁfty are included in the sample, the
ﬁrst observations on the cohorts born between 1934 and 1940 were not
used in the estimation. The ﬁnal sample consists of 127,390 observations
(from 15,619 individuals) in the male subsample and 123,979 observations
(from 14,820) individuals in the female subsample.
Table 10.17 reports means and standard deviations of most of the vari-
ables included. To save space, we exclude descriptive statistics of the
twenty-ﬁve county dummies.
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14. The education levels are described in table 10.11.
15. The socioeconomic groups are explained in table 10.10.10.6.3 Estimation Results
The results from the probit regression on retirement decisions are shown
in table 10.18 for men and table 10.19 for women. Each of the tables shows
six diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The three accrual measures described in section
10.5.1 are used in alternative speciﬁcations (i.e., the one-year beneﬁt accrual,
the peak value, and the option value accrual measures, respectively). For
each measure of accrual, there is one speciﬁcation with a linear age variable
(M1) and one with indicator variables for each one-year age group (M2).
To evaluate the model speciﬁcation, we tested for joint signiﬁcance of
the main groups of variables included—that is, the incentive variables and
the additional variables for the workers’ economic situation, education
level, socioeconomic group, family income, and county of residence. The
results show that all these groups are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (on the 5 per-
cent level) from zero in all speciﬁcations.
We  estimated the parameters in the option value measure by a grid
search in which the maximum of the log likelihood from the M2 model was
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Table 10.17 Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables Included in the Sample
Used in Estimations (monetary values in SKr; 1997 prices deﬂated by
the CPI)
Men Women
Mean SD Mean SD
Retired 0.055 0.228 0.060 0.238
Beneﬁt accrual 15,196 83,856 13,769 37,361
Peak value 107,746 170,984 104,804 128,149
Option value 37,044 35,893 48,365 24,210
SSW 1,265,103 437,801 933,227 325,278
Log lifetime earnings 11.73 0.39 9.81 0.42
Predicted log earnings 12.30 0.43 11.89 0.45
Education 1 0.446 0.497 0.351 0.477
Education 2 0.039 0.194 0.079 0.269
Education 3 0.176 0.381 0.321 0.467
Education 4 0.143 0.350 0.406 0.209
Education 5 0.077 0.266 0.095 0.293
Education 6 0.119 0.324 0.103 0.304
Occupation 1 0.382 0.486 0.200 0.400
Occupation 2 0.331 0.471 0.180 0.384
Occupation 3 0.129 0.336 0.154 0.361
Occupation 4 0.158 0.354 0.466 0.499
Married 0.754 0.431 0.723 0.448
Log lifetime earnings (spouse) 24.01 15.08 23.58 15.43
SSW (spouse) 940,866 762,528 1,050,550 805,860
Notes: SD   standard deviation. For the option value measure, we use   0.97,   0.75,
and k   4.7 for the male subsample and   0.97,   0.75, and k   1.25 for the female
subsample.Table 10.18 Results from Probit Regressions on Individual Retirement Decision (men)
Accrual Peak Value Option Value
M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
ACCR/106 –0.21 –0.09 –0.93 –0.92 –5.11 –6.74
(–2.08) (–0.81) (–10.12) (–9.94) (–9.39) (11.42)
1 million change –0.02 –0.01 –0.07 –0.07 –0.36 –0.49
SSW/106 0.55 0.57 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.24
(10.81) (10.99) (6.41) (6.43) (5.50) (4.16)
1 million change 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Lifetime earnings –2.60 –2.51 –2.76 –2.80 –2.43 –2.55
(–1.81) (–1.73) (–1.92) (–1.92) (–1.71) (–1.76)
Lifetime earnings2 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.011 0.10 0.12
(0.30) (0.14) (1.45) (1.39) (1.31) (1.58)
Predicted earnings –0.41 –0.57 1.47 1.40 1.26 1.59
(–0.26) (–0.36) (0.93) (0.87) (0.80) (1.00)
Predicted earnings2 –0.08 –0.07 –0.09 –0.09 –0.08 –0.10
(–1.79) (–1.76) (–2.14) (–2.16) (–1.91) (–1.94)
Lifetime   Predicted 0.35 0.37 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.08
(2.34) (2.39) (0.91) (0.96) (0.83) (0.53)
(Lifetime   Predicted)2 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01
(–2.90) (–2.87) (–1.78) (–1.77) (–1.62) (–1.33)
Education2 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
(6.63) (6.55) (6.91) (6.85) (6.92) (6.91)
Education3 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19
(10.70) (10.47) (11.19) (10.99) (11.23) (11.24)
Education4 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15
(6.09) (5.92) (6.87) (6.75) (6.88) (7.04)
Education5 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
(3.90) (3.59) (4.71) (4.44) (4.75) (4.73)
Education6 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(1.56) (1.42) (2.50) (2.41) (2.46) (2.59)
Occupation2 –0.19 –0.19 –0.17 –0.17 –0.17 –0.17
(–10.83) (–10.60) (–9.77) (–9.53) (–9.68) (–9.16)
Occupation3 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(1.01) (1.11) (1.38) (1.46) (1.42) (1.62)
Occupation4 –0.18 –0.19 –0.18 –0.19 –0.18 –0.19
(–8.84) (–8.90) (–8.68) (–8.78) (–8.82) (–8.90)
Age 0.12 0.11 0.11
(38.26) (38.39) (33.28)
Married –0.11 –0.11 –0.05 –0.06 –0.04 –0.02
(–2.37) (–2.51) (–1.21) (–1.29) (–0.93) (–0.47)
Lifetime earnings (spouse) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
(1.67) (1.95) (2.45) (2.77) (2.11) (2.63)
Lifetime earnings (spouse)2 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01
(–1.70) (–1.97) (–2.51) (–2.83) (–2.16) (–2.68)
SSW (spouse)/106 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
(3.26) (3.37) (3.01) (3.11) (2.98) (3.01)
Indicators for age No Yes No Yes No Yes
Indicators for counties Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.1593 0.1813 0.1621 0.1841 0.1612 0.1844
Log-likelihood –24,654 –24,011 –24,571 –23,928 –24,599 –23,920
Notes: Results based on 15,619 individuals and 127,390 observations. Numbers in parentheses are 
t-values.Table 10.19 Results From Probit Regressions on Individual Retirement Decision (women)
Accrual Peak Value Option Value
M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
ACCR/106 –1.00 –0.81 –1.42 –1.29 –23.4 –24.0
(–4.06) (–0.34) (–10.39) (–9.69) (–20.43) (–21.67)
1 million change –0.08 –0.01 –0.10 –1.70 –1.87 –1.87
SSW/106 0.35 0.44 0.07 0.13 –0.47 –0.48
(7.28) (8.93) (1.27) (2.16) (–7.13) (–7.14)
1 million change 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 –0.03 –0.04
Lifetime earnings –5.87 –5.67 –4.68 –4.60 –6.31 –6.22
(–3.18) (–2.94) (–2.47) (–2.34) (–3.39) (–3.25)
Lifetime earnings2 0.33 0.28 0.40 0.36 0.66 0.65
(4.22) (3.32) (5.07) (4.34) (7.32) (6.80)
Predicted earnings 4.21 4.27 5.94 6.02 5.53 8.82
(2.52) (2.44) (3.50) (3.38) (3.56) (3.56)
Predicted earnings2 –0.20 –0.23 –0.19 –0.22 –0.07 –0.08
(–3.05) (–3.24) (–3.05) (–3.20) (–1.26) (–1.47)
Lifetime • Predicted 0.14 0.21 –0.19 –0.12 –0.46 –0.46
(0.79) (1.12) (–1.06) (–0.66) (–2.85) (–2.68)
(Lifetime • Predicted)2 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00
(–1.80) (–1.76) (–0.37) (–0.38) (0.04) (0.19)
Education2 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.08
(2.14) (1.63) (2.27) (1.80) (3.44) (2.96)
Education3 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.09
(3.88) (3.53) (4.15) (3.87) (5.72) (5.52)
Education4 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.09
(1.99) (1.43) (2.23) (1.70) (3.32) (2.78)
Education5 –0.01 –0.01 –0.00 –0.00 0.04 0.05
(–0.45) (–0.54) (–0.07) (–0.05) (1.74) (1.80)
Education6 –0.09 –0.11 –0.08 –0.09 –0.02 –0.04
(–3.21) (–3.61) (–2.75) (–3.04) (–0.82) (–1.10)
Occupation2 –0.12 –0.12 –0.11 –0.11 –0.03 –0.03
(–5.22) (–4.97) (–5.12) (–4.93) (–1.48) (–1.29)
Occupation3 –0.04 –0.12 –0.04 –0.04 –0.02 –0.01
(–1.57) (–4.97) (–1.81) (–1.52) (–0.67) (–0.42)
Occupation4 –0.13 –0.02 –0.13 –0.13 –0.21 –0.21
(–7.14) (–1.10) (–7.27) (–6.82) (–11.34) (–10.95)
Age 0.15 0.14 0.09
(51.92) (50.07) (24.64)
Married 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.35
(4.37) (4.51) (4.61) (4.87) (4.96) (5.28)
Lifetime earnings (spouse) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.54) (0.33) (0.30) (0.12) (0.27) (0.04)
Lifetime earnings (spouse)2 –0.01 –0.00 –0.00 –0.01 –0.02 –0.02
(–0.93) (–0.71) (–0.66) (–0.48) (–0.67) (–0.43)
SSW (spouse)/106 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.02 –0.02
(–0.60) (–0.71) (–0.58) (–0.68) (–1.12) (–1.23)
Indicators for age No Yes No Yes No Yes
Indicators for counties Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.1736 0.1977 0.1762 0.2004 0.1828 0.2083
Log-likelihood –23,615 –22,926 –23,540 –22,850 –23,351 –22,624
Notes: Results based on 14,820 individuals and 123,979 observations. Numbers in parentheses are 
t-values.used as a value function. Although the log-likelihood function for men was
shown to be very ﬂat with respect to  and k, a maximum was found at   
0.97,   0.75, and k   4.7. These parameter values were then used to ob-
tain the estimates presented in table 10.18. However, we also estimated the
model using approximately the parameter values obtained by Stock and
Wise (1990), i.e.,   0.97,   0.75, and k  1.25. These values gave
smaller coeﬃcient estimates for the option value variable (coeﬃcient  106
at –4.28 [–4.56] for the M1 and –4.98 [–5.36] for the M2 speciﬁcation, re-
spectively), but slightly larger estimates for the SSW variable (coeﬃcient  
106 at 0.43 [7.28] for the M1 and 0.41 [6.86] for the M2 speciﬁcation, re-
spectively).
For the female subsample, the grid search did not result in any maximum
since the log-likelihood function was decreasing in k in the permitted re-
gion of values for k. For the estimates reported in table 10.19 we used   
0.97,   0.75, and k   1.25.
The most important result from the estimates is that economic incen-
tives seem to matter for retirement behavior: The coeﬃcients for the SSW
variable are, in general, signiﬁcantly positive, and those for the diﬀerent ac-
crual measures are, as expected, signiﬁcantly negative. There are, however,
some exceptions to this pattern. In the male sample, the beneﬁt accrual
measure is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the M2 speciﬁcation. In
the female sample, the variable for SSW of the spouse is insigniﬁcant in all
speciﬁcations, and the variable for the individual’s own SSW is signiﬁcant
with an unexpected sign in both speciﬁcations including the option value
measure.
The magnitude of the eﬀect from the economic incentive variables is hard
to quantify from the parameter estimates alone. According to the results
of the implied probability eﬀect of changing the incentive measure by
SKr1million, the eﬀect appears to be very small. It should be kept in mind,
however, that (as is evident from table 10.17) the average probability of re-
tirement is fairly low in the sample (0.055 for men and 0.060 for women)—
that is, an implied probability eﬀect of 0.03 corresponds to about a 50
percent increase in retirement. To gain a better understanding of the impli-
cations for the magnitude of the eﬀects of economic incentives from the esti-
mates, we simulated the eﬀects of two hypothetical reforms (cf. section 10.7).
It is evident from the results that the forward-looking incentive mea-
sures, peak value and option value, work better than the beneﬁt accrual
measure. The beneﬁt accrual coeﬃcient is only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero with the linear speciﬁcation in age. However, also for this speciﬁca-
tion, the log-likelihood values are larger for the models with the peak value
and option value measures. Considering the design of many of the pension
schemes, for example, the STP scheme in which three years of earnings be-
tween ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and ﬁfty-nine are required to be eligible for any pen-
sion at all, this outcome was expected.
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tion value measures: The log likelihood for the option value speciﬁcation
is lower in the male subsample for the M1 speciﬁcation, but higher for the
M2 speciﬁcation and in the female subsample. In the female subsample,
the measure of SSW takes an unexpected negative sign when the option
value incentive measure is used.
Another issue that could not be resolved on the basis of the results re-
ported in tables 10.18 and 10.19 alone is the extent to which the economic
incentive measures capture the observed pattern of retirement behavior.
Figure 10.3 shows the implied probability eﬀect of the age indicator vari-
ables, along with the actual hazard rate out of the labor force, by age for the
male and female subsamples. Our interpretation of this result is that the
economic incentive measures do not fully capture the age pattern of retire-
ment. The spike at age sixty-ﬁve tells us that collective agreements on re-
tirement ages, as described in section 10.2.5, have considerable inﬂuence
on retirement behavior.
10.7 Simulations
To evaluate the implications of the estimates, we simulated the eﬀects of
two hypothetical policy reforms on labor force participation. For the male
subsample, all three measures of accrual were used in the simulations,
whereas we only use one measure for the female subsample. Since we were
not able to estimate the parameters in the option value measure for fe-
males, we used the peak value measure.
In the ﬁrst policy reform, the age of eligibility for all programs is delayed
by three years. That is, the state old age pension, as well as the occupational
pension programs, could be claimed beginning at age sixty-three rather
than age sixty. The actuarial adjustments of pension levels, within both the
public and occupational pension systems, start from age sixty-eight rather
than sixty-ﬁve. Moreover, the probabilities for access to labor market in-
surance (DI, SI, and UI) is delayed by three years. The probit regression
model for probability of insurance eligibility was used to predict eligibility
probabilities under this policy reform.
In the second reform, the entire income security program (the state old
age pension, occupational pensions, and labor market insurance) is re-
placed by a hypothetical common pension scheme. This scheme replaces
60 percent of predicted earnings16 at age sixty if it is claimed at the normal
retirement age of sixty-ﬁve. The pension could be claimed beginning at age
sixty or delayed until age seventy. There is a 6 percent actuarial reduction
for each year of retirement before age sixty-ﬁve and a 6 percent increase for
each year retirement is delayed after age sixty-ﬁve. Since there is no labor
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16. We use the strategy for predicting future earnings described in section 10.5.market insurance, a worker who decides to retire before age sixty receives
no income until age sixty.
Figure 10.4 compares the sample median SSW by age, under the three
policy alternatives: the actual and the two hypothetical policies for males
and females. For males, it can be seen that there is a substantial diﬀerence
between the actual system and the two hypothetical schemes. At age sixty,
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A
B
Fig. 10.3 The implied probability eﬀect of the age dummies from the M2 speciﬁca-
tion with diﬀerent incentive measures along with the actual hazard rate out of the la-
bor force by age: A, men; B, womenA
B
Fig. 10.4 Median social security wealth; actual and simulated under policy alter-
natives 1 and 2, respectively: A, men; B, womenthe SSW is about 20 percent lower under both policy alternatives. As re-
gards the ﬁrst policy alternative, this diﬀerence is due to delaying of all ben-
eﬁts, and in the case of the second policy alternative, it is due to the aboli-
tion of labor market insurance and a reduction in replacement rates.
For females, panel B shows that the median SSW is very similar under
the actual and the second policy alternative for all ages. The most likely ex-
planation to this outcome is that, since the pension income is determined
by predicted earnings at age sixty, there is no reduction for being tem-
porarily out of the labor force before age sixty, as there is in the actual sys-
tem. For both males and females, all diﬀerences are counteracted by pro-
gressive income taxes and housing allowances.
Figures 10.5 to 10.7 show the three alternative measures of accrual by
age under the diﬀerent policy alternatives. Figure 10.5 shows that there are
two spikes in the beneﬁt accrual of working: the ﬁrst one is for working dur-
ing one’s ﬁfty-seventh year under the actual system (due to the rules in the
occupational pension scheme for blue-collar workers) and the second one
is for working during one’s ﬁfty-ninth year (due to the rule that pension
beneﬁts could not be claimed until age sixty). Under the ﬁrst policy alter-
native, these spikes are delayed by three years under the ﬁrst policy alter-
native and are entirely removed under the second policy alternative. It can
also be seen that beneﬁt accrual is zero up to age sixty under the second
policy alternative. Finally, it can be seen that beneﬁt accrual is zero up to
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Fig. 10.5 Median beneﬁt accrual; actual and simulated under policy alternatives 
1 and 2, respectively, menA
B
Fig. 10.6 Median peak value; actual and simulated under policy alternatives 1 and
2, respectively: A, men; B, womenage sixty under the second policy alternative, since earnings before age
sixty do not aﬀect the beneﬁt after retirement under this policy alternative.
The 6 percent actuarial adjustment under the second policy alternative is
not enough to generate positive beneﬁt accrual after age ﬁfty-nine.
The peak value measures under the diﬀerent policy alternatives, shown
in ﬁgure 10.6 for men and women, also reﬂect the particulars of each pol-
icy: The fall in peak value, due to the rules in the blue-collar worker pen-
sion scheme, is delayed by three years under the ﬁrst policy alternative,
while the peak value under the second policy alternative is constant up to
age sixty.
The median option value measure in ﬁgure 10.7 shows a marked diﬀer-
ence between the ﬁrst policy alternative on one hand, and the actual sys-
tem and the second policy alternative on the other. The option value of not
retiring is, of course, higher if the beneﬁts are delayed by three years.
We carried out three diﬀerent simulations for each policy change. The
ﬁrst simulation, S1, used the model with the linear speciﬁcation in age
(M1). The second, S2, used the model with age dummies (M2) without
changing anything except the measures of economic incentives according
to the two proposed policy changes. The speciﬁcation with indicator vari-
ables for each age group is likely to be overparameterized in the sense that
the estimated age pattern of retirement reﬂects some features of the pen-
sion system, in addition to variations in preferences for leisure by age and
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Fig. 10.7 Median option value; actual and simulated under policy alternatives 
1 and 2, respectively, meninstitutions on the labor market. This, in turn, implies that the predicted
eﬀect of a change in the social security system is underestimated. We there-
fore use the outcome from this simulation as a lower bound.
In the third simulation, S3, we again used the M2 model, but here, for the
ﬁrst policy alternative, each dummy variable is incremented by three years
in addition to the changes done in S2. This procedure corresponds to the
(unrealistic) assumption that the entire age pattern of retirement behavior
estimated by the age indicator variables is determined by the social security
system. We use this simulation as an upper bound on the predicted out-
come. For the second policy alternative, the ages for early and normal re-
tirement coincide with those in the actual Swedish system. This means that
the S2 and S3 simulations coincide.
Since we used three diﬀerent measures of accrual for each of the three
simulations in the male subsample, and only peak value in the female sub-
sample, there are nine simulations for men and three for women. We pre-
sent three diﬀerent outcomes from the simulations. First, table 10.20 shows
the predicted average retirement rate and age for each policy alternative
and each simulation. Figures 10.8–10.19 show predicted hazard rates out
of the labor force and cumulative distribution functions of retirement by
age. Each ﬁgure shows three graphs: one for the model prediction of actual
policy and one for each of the policy alternatives.
It is evident from table 10.20 and the ﬁgures that most models predict the
largest eﬀect on retirement behavior from the ﬁrst policy alternative. The
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Table 10.20 Average Retirement Rates and Retirement Ages in Simulations
Baseline Policy 1 Policy 2
Retirement Retirement Retirement Retirement Retirement Retirement
Model Rate Age Rate Age Rate Age
Men
S1 and beneﬁt accrual 0.0577 62.60 0.0461 63.40 0.0447 63.52
S2 and beneﬁt accrual 0.0577 62.57 0.0463 63.37 0.0447 63.50
S3 and beneﬁt accrual 0.0577 62.57 0.0246 65.33 0.0447 63.50
S1 and peak value 0.0576 62.60 0.0480 63.24 0.0526 62.91
S2 and peak value 0.0577 62.57 0.0483 63.20 0.0529 62.88
S3 and peak value 0.0577 62.57 0.0264 65.12 0.0529 62.88
S1 and option value 0.0577 62.57 0.0457 63.44 0.0507 63.10
S2 and option value 0.0577 62.57 0.0461 63.37 0.0529 62.92
S3 and option value 0.0577 62.57 0.0269 65.07 0.0529 62.92
Women
S1 and peak value 0.0626 61.97 0.0593 62.15 0.0730 61.37
S2 and peak value 0.0625 61.95 0.0590 62.14 0.0724 61.38
S3 and peak value 0.0625 61.95 0.0288 64.36 0.0724 61.38
Note:Since workers older than age 70 are not included in the data, we set the hazard rate at age 70 to one
(100%).A
B
Fig. 10.8 S1 using beneﬁt accrual estimates, men: A, predicted hazard rates; 
B, predicted CDFA
B
Fig. 10.9 S2 using beneﬁt accrual estimates, men: A, predicted hazard rates; 
B, predicted CDFA
B
Fig. 10.10 S3 using beneﬁt accrual estimates, men: A, predicted hazard rates; 
B, predicted CDFA
B
Fig. 10.11 S1 using peak value estimates, men: A, predicted hazard rates; 
B, predicted CDFA
B
Fig. 10.12 S2 using peak value estimates, men: A, predicted hazard rates; 
B, predicted CDFA
B
Fig. 10.13 S3 using peak value estimates, men: A, predicted hazard rates; 
B, predicted CDFA
B
Fig. 10.14 S1 using option value estimates, men: A, predicted hazard rates; 
B, predicted CDFA
B
Fig. 10.15 S2 using option value estimates, men: A, predicted hazard rates; 
B, predicted CDFA
B
Fig. 10.16 S3 using option value estimates, men: A, predicted hazard rates; 
B, predicted CDFA
B
Fig. 10.17 S1 using peak value estimates, women: A, predicted hazard rates; 
B, predicted CDFA
B
Fig. 10.18 S2 using peak value estimates, women: A, predicted hazard rates; 
B, predicted CDFA
B
Fig. 10.19 S3 using peak value estimates, women: A, predicted hazard rates; 
B, predicted CDFexception from this pattern is the models using the beneﬁt accrual measure.
For the peak and option value measures, the predicted delay in average re-
tirement age is between 0.63 and 0.87 years for ﬁrst policy alternative for
the S1 and S2 simulations, compared to between 0.31 and 0.53 for the sec-
ond policy alternative.
The predictions of average delay in retirement for the S3 simulation are
between 2.50 and 2.76 for the ﬁrst policy alternative. The diﬀerence of
these predictions vis-à-vis those of S1 and S2 shows that there is a large el-
ement of uncertainty in the predictions from all our models. There are two
diﬀerent sources of this uncertainty.
The ﬁrst source regards the extent to which spikes at ages sixty and sixty-
ﬁve in the hazard rates for retirement can be attributed to economic incen-
tives or institutional arrangements on the labor market. For the spike at
age sixty, it is likely that it can be attributed largely to economic incentives.
In most pension plans, pensions can be claimed starting from age sixty. It
is also the case that most workers have fulﬁlled the requirements for num-
ber of years of contributions to the plan at age sixty. For the second spike
at age sixty-ﬁve, however, it is likely that it can be attributed largely to the
collective agreements on retirement age between the unions and the em-
ployers’ confederation on the labor market. Thus, to some degree, deter-
mining the extent to which the reform proposal on delayed eligibility age
also includes delayed retirement age in the collective agreements is a mat-
ter of interpretation of the reform proposal.
The second source of uncertainty is the extent to which the dummy vari-
able speciﬁcation for the way age aﬀects retirement reﬂects changes in pref-
erences for being retired due to aging (primarily through changes in health
status) or the extent to which it reﬂects unmeasured economic incentives
from the income security system. If it is primarily due to changes in pref-
erences due to aging, the lower bound is a better prediction of the outcome.
However, without detailed data on changes in health status, it is not pos-
sible to disentangle these eﬀects.
The results in the female sample can be seen in ﬁgures 10.29–10.34 and
in table 10.20. The simulations of the ﬁrst policy reform show that there is
a smaller predicted behavioral eﬀect of the reform for women than for men.
In S1 and S2, there is only, on average, a 0.18 or 0.19 years delay of retire-
ment due to the reform. The big eﬀect in S3 shows that the uncertainty of
the predictions is even greater for females compared to males.
For the second policy alternative, there is an eﬀect toward earlier retire-
ment in the female sample. The background to this result contains several
diﬀerent elements. First of all, most pension plans in Sweden have a linear
reduction in the replacement rates if the worker has contributed less than
thirty years to the plan. This is binding for a large share of the women stud-
ied here, but a much smaller share of the men. Since the pension under the
second policy alternative is determined as a fraction of earnings at age
Income Security Programs and Retirement in Sweden 639sixty, the SSW is actually lower for a large share of the female sample, com-
pared to the baseline policy. This can be seen for the median SSW in ﬁgure
10.6. The eﬀect through the SSW of the spouse is reduced, or actually re-
versed, since the coeﬃcient estimates of the spouse’s SSW were insigniﬁ-
cant (with the unexpected sign) in the female sample. Finally, since there
are no actuarial adjustments before age sixty under the second policy al-
ternative, the eﬀect through the peak value accrual measure under the
baseline policy is thus reduced under the second policy alternative. This ex-
plains the higher hazard rates to retirement under the second policy alter-
native before age sixty.
10.8 Conclusions
The results of the econometric analysis in our study support the notion
that economic incentives matter for the retirement decision. The parame-
ter estimates for the economic incentive variables were, in general, signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero with the expected signs. This applies in partic-
ular to the male sample. The results also show that the forward-looking
accrual measures, the peak and option value measures, work somewhat
better than the one-year beneﬁt accrual measure, since they give a better ﬁt
to the data.
Our simulations of two hypothetical policy reforms showed that there
would be a substantial eﬀect on labor force participation from changing
the economic incentives of retirement. However, there is a large element of
uncertainty in such predictions in the sense that the lower bound on the
predictions, where the one-year age group dummies were maintained, pre-
dicted much lower labor force participation rates compared to the upper
bound on the predictions, where the age dummies were shifted by three
years. The extent to which the age indicator variables capture features of
income security programs, which are unmeasured by the economic incen-
tive variables, changes in preferences for leisure by age, collective agree-
ments on normal retirement ages in the labor market, or social norms re-
garding retirement, is an open question to be explored in further research.
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